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Abstract 
 
Introduction 
The aim of this Master Thesis is to develop a software security guideline that 
will be used for evaluating methods and measuring security in open source 
projects with a high security implication such as healthcare applications for 
example, where the privacy and security is a crucial factor. 
 
Background Theory 
First section of thesis is focused on presenting the appropriate background 
theory that will be needed for a good understanding of the rest of the thesis, like 
vulnerabilities, common security attacks, definition of the client-server 
technology, risk analysis and specific theory about Indivo and the healthcare 
field. 
 
Methods 
The method chosen to develop the guideline was the waterfall model as time 
was quite limited and only one iteration could be done. That’s why no other 
methods like the spiral model were used, as they require several iterations until 
achieving functionality. 
 
Results 
After applying the guideline, several vulnerabilities were found, like session 
hijacking or capturing login information on real time. The guideline proved to be 
useful in revealing serious security issues that should be fixed, and into 
describing the purpose and the logic of decisions made in early stages like 
organizational or design stage. 
 
Conclusion 
Both the development of the Security Guideline and the posterior testing of the 
guideline were considered successful, as a working methodology was 
established and several security issues were revealed in Indivo. 
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1. Introduction 
 
An Open Source consumer application is a piece of software whose source 
code is made available to the public through a special kind of license that 
permits users to study, modify and make improvements in the application, as 
well as to redistribute it in its original shape or in a modified way.  
Open Source consumer applications, as all the rest of the software, are 
exposed to a high amount of security threats, but this becomes a bigger 
problem for this kind of software because as the code is available to everyone, 
it is easier to search and to find flaws and security holes on them. 
 
1.1 Motivation 
 
Each day software security becomes more and more important. Usually, people 
tends to put more efforts or to emphasize on network security, but we should 
realize that no matter how strong our network security is, if the software running 
inside our machines is not secure (i.e. it has some kind of bug, flaw that allows 
the code to be exploited), attackers will always find the way to break security. 
Lets say you can try to protect your network with a really good firewall with a 
really methodical configuration; even if the firewall is 100% perfect, if some of 
the software allowed to connect through the firewall is not secure, attackers will 
have an easy way to get into, without you even noticing it, not to say that the 
firewall itself can have some security flaw. 
 
There are several reasons why developing a guideline about software security 
is interesting: 
 
1. Security is the main system’s feature to protect confidential data, only 
developing and having secure software, confidential data will be as safer as 
possible. And that’s really a crucial factor for a lot of software nowadays. 
 
2. It should teach software designers that software security is an important thing to 
take care about from the very beginning, and not only trying to fix security holes 
with patches, after software has already been released. 
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1.2 Project Context 
 
The thesis is part of a research project carried out by the NSEP about an Open 
Source Consumer Application for the healthcare field, which is used to manage 
patient health records, called Indivo.  
Parallel to this thesis, there is other research work being done about access 
control over the same application. 
Because of the data that this kind of program deals with (personal health record 
information), security on this context is a crucial factor. 
 
1.3 Problem Definition 
 
The aim of the thesis is to develop a guideline for software security that will be 
used for evaluating methods and measuring security in open source projects 
with a high security implication.  
The guideline will not only cover evaluating and measuring security after the 
development of the product, but also in the very early stages of its development. 
Developing secure software is something that must be carried out since the 
very first stage of development of a piece of software.  
Checking security only afterwards and patching the product, is not only an extra 
effort that can be saved if security is present in the early life of a product, but 
also it can introduce new security flaws in the product that would need 
subsequent patches. 
After the guideline will be fully developed, it will be tested against an Open 
Source Software Application for the healthcare field (Indivo), which is still in 
development stage. 
 
1.4 Report Outline 
 
The structure of the report is as follows: 
 
• Chapter 2 presents background theory about security, common 
technologies used in application development and specific Indivo and 
healthcare theory. 
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• Chapter 3 gives a brief presentation and summary of the methods used 
in the development of this thesis. 
• Chapter 4 develops the main point of this thesis, the Security Guideline. 
• Chapter 5 applies the Security Guideline to a real application: Indivo. 
• Chapter 6 is a discussion of the thesis and of the results obtained when 
testing the guideline. 
• Chapter 7 gives conclusions for the thesis and proposes further work 
that can be done. 
• Appendix A contains the references used in the development of the 
thesis. 
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2. Background Theory 
 
This chapter gives a theoretical background for the thesis, defining the most 
important concepts and areas that are needed for a good understanding of 
subsequent chapters. 
First of all, I give an overview about what Computer Security is. After what is a 
vulnerability is defined and after having this information, I explain what Security 
Attacks are, and the possible types of attacks.  
The chapter continues with a fast overview of Web Services, and after this, the 
two ways of developing software are presented: Open source and Closed 
source.  
I then present some of the most important Distributed Object Platforms, to 
continue after this with an overview of the Client - Server architecture. I continue 
describing what Cryptography is and we give a short view on cryptographic 
methods. 
After this, I describe what a Security Evaluation Standard is and why not to use 
Common Criteria on the security evaluation of this thesis is discussed. This 
chapter continues introducing some theory and concepts of what Risk 
Management is and its importance in security evaluation. 
Last but not least, I introduce some important theory background about 
healthcare and Indivo healthcare application for a better understanding of the 
analysis part of the thesis.   
 
2.1 Computer Security 
 
“The only truly secure system is one that is powered off, cast in a block of 
concrete and sealed in a lead-lined room with armed guards - and even then I 
have my doubts”.  - Eugene H. Spafford [1] 
 
Computer security is defined as the ability of protecting information and system 
resources respecting crucial concepts as confidentiality, integrity, 
authentication, and availability. This definition not only includes the information 
“per se”, but also other computer elements such as disks, CPU and programs. 
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Confidentiality ensures that information is not accessed by unauthorized 
persons. Usually this is obtained by the use of access control and cryptography. 
 
Integrity refers to the fact that information is not modified by unauthorized 
persons in a way that is not possible to detect by rightful owners/recipients of 
that information. 
 
Authentication is any process by which you verify that someone is who they 
claim they are. This usually involves a username and a password, but can 
include any other method of demonstrating identity, such as a smart card, retina 
scan, voice recognition, or fingerprints [2].  
 
Availability refers to the ability of using the information or resource desired in a 
given moment. The loss of availability, if caused by an attack, is often referred 
as DoS – Denial of Service. 
 
Poor computer security is caused by vulnerabilities in software. This allows a 
malicious user to exploit the vulnerability through an attack. 
 
2.2 Vulnerabilities 
 
A security vulnerability is a flaw in a product that makes it infeasible - even 
when using the product properly - to prevent an attacker from usurping 
privileges on the user's system, regulating its operation, compromising data on 
it, or assuming ungranted trust as said in Microsoft TechNet [3]. 
Often, the word vulnerability and attack are used without difference, but note 
that an attack is possible because of a vulnerability; they are different things 
and we need to keep them separately.  
Simple said vulnerabilities provide the entry point for an attacker to launch an 
attack. 
 
There are many kind of vulnerabilities, and description of every vulnerability is 
out of the scope of this thesis. The following examples of vulnerabilities are only 
for better understanding of the theory for the reader. 
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Cross Site Scripting Flaws occur whenever an application takes user supplied 
data and sends it to a web browser without first validating or encoding that 
content. 
 
Injection Flaws occurs when user supplied data is sent to an interpreter as part 
of a command or query. The attacker’s hostile data tricks the interpreter into 
executing unintended commands or changing data. 
 
Improper Error Handling occurs when applications can unintentionally leak 
information about their configuration, internal workings, or violate privacy 
through a variety of application problems. Attackers use this weakness to 
violate privacy, or conduct further attacks. 
 
Unvalidated Input occurs when information from web requests is not validated 
before it is used by a web application. Attackers may exploit vulnerabilities of 
this kind to attack back end components through a web application. 
 
These are only few vulnerabilities of the many existing. These vulnerabilities 
and many more existing, provide an “attack launch point” for the malicious user. 
 
A good and very complete overview of application vulnerabilities can be found 
in  OWASP website [4]. 
 
2.3 Security Attacks 
 
A security attack is an action towards a system to exploit a vulnerability. Usually 
the aim of an attack is to gain access to confidential information that the 
attacker is not allowed to see or to get, or to gain the control of a system in an 
illegitimate way. 
Knowing how attacks work is important for being able to understand how 
computer security works.  
In the following part of this section I will describe how several important well 
known attacks work. 
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2.3.1 Buffer Overflow Attacks 
 
“On many C implementations it is possible to corrupt the execution stack by 
writing past the end of an array declared auto in a routine.  Code that does this 
is said to smash the stack, and can cause return from the routine to jump to a 
random address.  This can produce some of the most insidious data-dependent 
bugs known to mankind.”  Aleph One [5] 
 
Buffer overflows occur when a function in an application fails to check the size 
of the input data. If the input data size is bigger than the size the application has 
reserved for the data, it doesn’t fits and overwrites other memory locations in 
the execution stack as can be seen in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1: Buffer Overflow [26] 
 
a) Program before invoking function A. 
b) Function A is invoked and it books space for buffer B. 
c) Input in buffer B is bigger than it can hold, resulting in other memory locations 
of execution stack being overwritten (grey color). 
 
This situation by itself only will make the program to crash, nothing more.  
The dangerous situation occurs when the attacker uses the overflow to 
overwrite the return address with the address of some other piece of code, that 
when executed, will result in giving the control of the machine to the attacker.  
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2.3.2 DoS – Denial of Service 
 
Basis for this attack is that executing code takes time.  
As Andrews and Whittaker [6] say, for each function called by the Web server, 
the application or the database a certain number of processor cycles are used 
in executing that function.  
If that operation is long lived and the operating system cannot switch to any 
other task, the machine will be tied up servicing only that request. Even if the 
machine is multithread or multiprocess, if we can flood it with enough request to 
service long running operations, we can deny other users from accessing the 
service that the machine is offering.  
This kind of attack is called DoS or Denial of Service. 
The Denial of Service attack violates directly one of the principles of computer 
security, the availability. 
 
2.3.3 IP Spoofing & Man-in-the-Middle 
 
IP Spoofing consists in forging the IP address of the packets going from the 
attacker’s machine to the victim’s machine, so the victim will think that packets 
actually come from another machine different than the one they are coming 
really.  
This attack is useful when trying to appear as a trusted host to get benefits from 
what that trust relation offers for the rightful machine. 
The difficulty on IP Spoofing attacks relies in that the response is sent to the 
forged IP and not to the attacker’s machine, so attacker should be quite skilful 
to get back that response, or to be in the same network that the victim’s 
machine to be able to capture the packets that are being sent to the forged IP 
machine. 
IP Spoofing is used as part of more sophisticated attacks like Man-in-the-Middle 
attacks, where the attacker’s machine is in the middle of the communication line 
between two other hosts A and B (the victims). 
By forging the IP address of the packets the attacker can make to believe the 
victim machine A that he is the victim machine B and to make that the victim 
machine B thinks that he is the victim machine A, thus being able to view, 
capture and modify every piece of information that will go from A to B without 
any substantial effort, becoming that way the “Man-in-the-Middle”. 
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2.3.4 SQL Injection 
 
This attack can be launched against any application that uses user-supplied 
input to dynamically construct SQL queries against a database. 
The problem here relies in the attacker trying to trick the application into 
changing the nature of the query by entering SQL artifacts into that user input, 
giving him unrestricted access to the database. 
This attack is more easy and clear to understand when looking through an 
example about how to conduct this attack: 
 
Lets suppose that login into some system is achieved by performing a SQL 
query against a database with the login information that the user provides. That 
means that the SQL query is constructed dynamically with the input that user 
supplies, in this case a login username and a password. 
The query that will retrieve user information with the database would look like 
this: 
 
SELECT userdata FROM userinfo 
WHERE userid = ‘id’ 
AND password = ‘pwd’ 
 
User controlled strings in that query are the ones between single quotes. 
Normally, user would have to put both the userid and the password correctly for 
the SQL query to result in a successful login. But a skilled attacker can use SQL 
language to make that the query will give him access not even knowing the 
userid. 
In SQL the double dash operator means a comment (--). Therefore we can alter 
the construction of the query by inserting specific SQL tokens into the user input 
fields. If in the userid field we would type ‘ OR 1=1 -- the following query will be 
generated: 
 
SELECT userdata FROM userinfo 
WHERE userid = ‘ ‘ OR 1=1 
 
As anything “ORed” with a true statement like 1=1 (that is always true), is 
evaluated like true, we would obtain the userdata from every user at the 
database without having to know any single userid or password. Note that with 
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the double dash (--) we manage to make the password part of the query to be 
interpreted as a comment and thus not taking part in the real query that will be 
sent to the database [6]. 
In the same way, we can alter queries to create new users on a database, to 
drop tables of a database or whatever thing that SQL sentences can permit. 
 
2.3.5 Cross Site Scripting (XSS) 
 
This attack is based on the fact that websites often echo the data that is entered 
at some other place within the application. The problem is when that data 
doesn’t contain simple HTML plaintext but some kind of script that will be 
executed into other machines visiting the site. Moreover, the biggest problem 
comes when that data that other people’s machine will view is possible to be 
entered by a totally random person. 
 
Let’s take the example of the guestbooks at websites. Usually, users are free to 
write whatever they want, and other users will read that comments. But with 
HTML tags such as <script> one attacker can supply data that will be seen by 
other users in the shape of a script, which will be executed in the victim’s 
machine. 
 
The effects of a XSS attack can vary from simple annoyance to complete 
account compromise.  
The most severe XSS attacks involve disclosure of a users session cookies. 
Other damaging attacks include the disclosure of end user files, installation of 
trojan horses, redirecting a user to some other page or site, and modifying 
presentation of content. 
 
As Andrews and Whittaker explains in their book [6], retrieving a user’s active 
cookie is as simple as embedding in some user data input, a script like this: 
 
<script> 
document.write(“<img src=http://attacker.com/ 
px.gif?cookie=”+document.cookie”) 
</script> 
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When another user will visit a page that displays that malicious input, the 
attacker’s server log, where that image is hosted, will store his session id when 
the victim’s browser is requesting the image so the attacker can get valid 
session identifiers in real time. 
 
2.3.6 Directory Transversal 
 
As OWASP website [4] explains, this category of attacks exploits various path 
vulnerabilities to access files or directories that are not intended to be accessed.  
This attack works on applications that take user input and use it in a "path" that 
is used to access a file system. If the attacker includes special characters that 
modify the meaning of the path, the application will misbehave and may allow 
the attacker to access unauthorized resources.  
This type of attack has been successful on web servers, application servers, 
and custom code. 
 
The most basic Directory Traversal attack uses the '../' special character 
sequence to alter the location of the request. By using this special character an 
attacker might be able to retrieve a file directly that he was not supposed to 
have access to. 
 
Another approach is to target the application itself. Most commonly the use of 
parameters being passed by the application can be exploited. Such data can 
come from user input or application data being passed between pages. Let’s 
take the example of: http://victim.com/getfile.asp?file=xxxfile.htm. 
We can observe from the above that “getfile.asp” takes a parameter to navigate 
through the application; in this case, the file location is xxxfile.htm. We can use 
this knowledge to attempt the retrieval of getfile.asp's source code by 
submitting: http://victim.com/getfile.asp?file=getfile.asp. 
 
We can combine these two approaches to try to access every file we want into 
the server. 
 
 
 
 
 19
Evaluating Security in Open Source Consumer Applications 
  
2.3.7 Session Hijacking 
 
The attacker’s objective in session hijacking is to masquerade as another user 
by stealing that person’s identifying credentials and using them for his own 
profit. The most common way of achieving this is to steal the user’s session 
identifier by diverse methods. It is also possible not to steal but to give directly a 
user a “compromised session”. 
 
Attacks taking part on this particular attack can involve Cross Site Scripting to 
get session identifiers in real time as it was discussed previously, monitoring 
network traffic or guessing future session identifiers because of poorly 
implemented session handlers. 
 
Another particular way of developing this attack is to do what is called “session 
fixation”. This particular way of session hijacking attack, involves stealing the 
session ID before the legitimate user will ever get it. With this technique, the 
attacker is able to take the session from the legitimate user every time is 
profitable to do so. For this purpose, attacker should get a valid session ID and 
provide it to a user by giving a link to the web page with the session ID already 
included in the link. Because the session is a valid one, the victim doesn’t notice 
the difference. However, the difference is that in this case, attacker can assume 
the victim’s identity in any moment. 
 
 
Figure 2: Session Fixation Attack [27] 
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2.4 Web Services 
 
The W3C [7] defines a Web service as a software system designed to support 
interoperable Machine to Machine interaction over a network. Web services are 
frequently just Web APIs that can be accessed over a network, such as the 
Internet, and executed on a remote system hosting the requested services. 
The W3C Web service definition encompasses many different systems, but in 
common usage the term refers to those services that use SOAP-formatted XML 
envelopes and have their interfaces described by WSDL. 
 
 
Figure 3: Web Services. [28] 
 
Four technologies take part on web services: eXtensible Mark-up Language 
(XML), Simple Object Access protocol (SOAP), Web Services Description 
Language (WSDL) and Universal Discovery Description and Integration (UDDI). 
 
2.4.1 XML 
 
EXtensible Mark-up Language (XML) is a simple, very flexible text format 
derived from SGML (ISO 8879). Originally designed to meet the challenges of 
large-scale electronic publishing, XML is also playing an increasingly important 
role in the exchange of a wide variety of data on the Web and elsewhere [7]. 
 
XML uses a similar tag structure as HTML; however, whereas HTML defines 
how elements are displayed, XML defines what those elements contain. While 
HTML uses predefined tags, XML allows tags to be defined by the developer of 
the page. Thus, virtually any data items, such as "id," "price" and "vendor" can 
be identified, allowing Web pages to function like database records. By 
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providing a common method for identifying data, XML supports business-to-
business transactions and has become "the" format for electronic data 
interchange and Web services. 
 
2.4.2 SOAP 
 
Soap is a way to transport XML from one end point to another. It supports 
almost every standard transmission protocol such as TCP, HTTP, and SMTP. 
The aim of SOAP is to provide an envelope to XML messages so they can be 
carried by a variety of transport mechanisms. 
SOAP messages are divided into two parts, the header and the body.  
 
2.4.3 WSDL 
 
WSDL is an XML-based service description on how to communicate using web 
services. The WSDL defines services as collections of network endpoints, or 
ports. WSDL specification provides an XML format for documents for this 
purpose. 
Messages are abstract descriptions of the data being exchanged, and port 
types are abstract collections of supported operations. In this way, WSDL 
describes the public interface to the web service. 
WSDL is often used in combination with SOAP and XML Schema to provide 
web services over the Internet. A client program connecting to a web service 
can read the WSDL to determine what functions are available on the server. 
Any special datatypes used are embedded in the WSDL file in the form of XML 
Schema. The client can then use SOAP to actually call one of the functions 
listed in the WSDL [8]. 
 
2.4.4 UDDI 
 
UDDI is a platform-independent, XML-based registry for businesses worldwide 
to list themselves on the Internet. UDDI is an open industry initiative enabling 
businesses to publish service listings and discover each other and define how 
the services or software applications interact over the Internet.  
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It is designed to be interrogated by SOAP messages and to provide access to 
Web Services Description Language documents describing the protocol 
bindings and message formats required to interact with the web services listed 
in its directory [8]. 
 
2.5 Open Source and Closed Source 
 
"As far as firms are concerned, they should take strict measures to ensure that 
sensitive information is only transmitted via secure media.... If security is to be 
taken seriously, only those operating systems should be used whose source 
code has been published and checked, since only then can it be determined 
with certainty what happens to the data." [9] 
 
Open source and closed source are two approaches to the control, exploitation 
and commercializing of computer software.  
Open source approaches differ from the traditional model of software licensing 
by allowing other individuals and organizations to view and modify the source 
code, and in many cases, resell the software without providing royalties to the 
original authors of the software, or under some open source licenses without 
even requiring that they credit the original authors of the software. 
 
2.5.1 Open Source 
 
Open-source software is an antonym for closed source software and refers to 
any computer software whose source code is available under a license (or 
arrangement such as the public domain) that permits users to study, change, 
and improve the software, and to redistribute it in modified or unmodified form. It 
is often developed in a public, collaborative manner. It is the most prominent 
example of open source development [8]. 
 
2.5.2 Closed Source 
 
Closed source refers to any program whose license does not meet the definition 
of Open-source software. Generally, it means only the binaries of a computer 
program are distributed and the license provides no access to the program's 
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source code, rendering modifications to the software technically impossible for 
practical purposes. The source code of such programs is usually regarded as a 
trade secret of the company [8]. 
 
2.6 Distributed Object Platform 
 
These days, client/server applications are being built with software systems 
based on distributed objects. These technologies provide for remote availability 
of resources, redundancy and parallelism [10]. 
 
2.6.1 CORBA 
 
The Common Object Request Broker Architecture (CORBA) is a standard 
defined by the Object Management Group (OMG) that enables software 
components written in multiple computer languages and running on multiple 
computers to interoperate [8]. 
CORBA inserts program code into a “pack” containing information about the 
capabilities of the code inside and how to call it. The resulting objects can then 
be called from other programs (or CORBA objects) across a network. 
CORBA uses an interface definition language (IDL) to specify the interfaces that 
objects will present to the world. CORBA then maps from IDL to a specific 
implementation language like C++ or Java. 
 
 
Figure 4: CORBA Server [29] 
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2.6.2 RMI 
 
JAVA Remote Method Invocation (RMI), it’s a mechanism offered by Java to 
invoke a method remotely. 
Using RMI, a program can export an object. From that moment, the object is 
available for every client to connect to it and to use its methods. 
The way RMI works is very similar to CORBA with the exception that RMI can 
be only used with Java coded servers. In the other hand, it provides passing 
object by reference and automated garbage collection, something that CORBA 
doesn’t have. 
 
 
Figure 5: Java RMI [30] 
 
 
2.7 Client – Server Architecture 
 
Client - server is network architecture which separates a client (often an 
application that uses a graphical user interface) from a server. Each instance of 
the client software can send requests to a server. Specific types of servers 
include web servers, application servers, file servers, terminal servers, and mail 
servers. While their purposes vary somewhat, the basic architecture remains 
the same. 
 
The term client/server was first used in the 1980s in reference to personal 
computers (PCs) on a network. The actual client/server model started gaining 
acceptance in the late 1980s.  
The client/server software architecture is a versatile, message-based and 
modular infrastructure that is intended to improve usability, flexibility, 
interoperability, and scalability as compared to centralized, mainframe, time 
sharing computing.  
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A client is defined as a requester of services and a server is defined as the 
provider of services. A single machine can be both a client and a server 
depending on the software configuration [11]. 
 
2.7.1 Two Tier Architecture 
 
As can be seen in figure 6, with two tier client/server architectures, the user 
system interface is usually located in the user's desktop environment and the 
database management services are usually in a server that is a more powerful 
machine that services many clients.  
Processing management is split between the user system interface environment 
and the database management server environment. The database 
management server provides stored procedures and triggers. 
 
 
Figure 6: Two Tier Architecture [31] 
 
2.7.2 Three Tier Architecture 
 
This architecture consists, as shown in figure 7, of three logical tiers, namely the 
presentation tier, application tier and the data tier. 
 
The first tier, the presentation tier, is responsible for presenting data to end 
users or systems. This tier includes web browsers and web servers. They may 
also include application components that create the page layout. 
 
The second tier, the application tier, is the engine of a web application. It 
performs the business logic, like processing user input, making decisions, 
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obtaining more data, and sends data to the presentation tier which presents it to 
the user. 
 
The third tier is the data tier, which is used to store things needed by the 
application, and acts as a repository for both temporary and permanent data. 
 
 
Figure 7: Three Tier Architecture [32] 
 
2.8 Cryptography 
 
As Kessler says [12], in data and telecommunications, cryptography is 
necessary when communicating over any untrusted medium, which includes 
just about any network, particularly the Internet. 
Within the context of any application-to-application communication, there are 
some specific security requirements, including: 
 
Authentication: The process of proving one's identity.  
 
Privacy/confidentiality: Ensuring that no one can read the message except 
the intended receiver.  
 
Integrity: Assuring the receiver that the received message has not been altered 
in any way from the original.  
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Non-repudiation: A mechanism to prove that the sender really sent this 
message.  
 
Cryptography, then, not only protects data from theft or alteration, but can also 
be used for user authentication.  
There are, in general, two types of cryptographic schemes typically used to 
accomplish these goals: secret key (or symmetric) cryptography and public-key 
(or asymmetric) cryptography.  
In all cases, the initial unencrypted data is referred to as plaintext. It is 
encrypted into ciphertext, which will be decrypted into usable plaintext again. 
 
2.8.1 Symmetric Cryptography 
 
 With symmetric cryptography, a single key is used for both encryption and 
decryption. 
With this form of cryptography, it is obvious that the key must be known to both 
the sender and the receiver. The biggest difficulty with this approach, of course, 
is the distribution of the key. 
Secret key cryptography schemes are generally categorized as being either 
stream ciphers or block ciphers.  
 
Stream ciphers operate on a single bit (byte or computer word) at a time.  
A block cipher is so-called because the scheme encrypts one block of data at a 
time using the same key on each block.  
 
Among the symmetric cryptography algorithms, the most important are: 
 
DES (Data Encryption Standard) with all its variants like tripleDES or DESX. 
AES (Advanced Encryption Standard). 
 
2.8.2 Public Key Cryptography 
 
Public key cryptography, also known as asymmetric cryptography, is a form of 
cryptography in which a user has a pair of cryptographic keys - a public key and 
a private key.  
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The private key is kept secret, while the public key may be widely distributed. 
The keys are related mathematically, but the private key cannot be practically 
derived from the public key. A message encrypted with the public key can be 
decrypted only with the corresponding private key. 
The biggest advantage is that private key never needs to be distributed, thus 
making a lot easier to keep it secret. 
Anyone can encrypt a message using the public key, but only the holder of the 
private key related to the public one can decrypt the message. Secrecy 
depends on the secrecy of the private key. 
 
 
Figure 8: Public Key encryption/decryption [33] 
 
Among the public key algorithms, probably the most famous is the RSA 
algorithm that has that name due to the initials of its creators, Rivest, Shamir 
and Adleman. 
 
2.9 Security Evaluation Standards 
 
For security evaluation purposes, entities and governments have created what 
are called security evaluation standards, which are used to certify that a piece 
of software is secure enough according to that standard. 
In this section I will present the most important one, the Common Criteria, and 
after, why not to use such a standard in the development of our security 
guideline will be discussed. 
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2.9.1 Common Criteria 
 
The Common Criteria (CC) is an international standard (ISO/IEC 15408) for 
computer security. Unlike standards such as FIPS 140, Common Criteria does 
not provide a list of product security requirements or features that products must 
contain.  
Instead, it describes a framework in which computer system users can specify 
their security requirements, vendors can then implement and/or make claims 
about the security attributes of their products and testing laboratories can 
evaluate the products to determine if they actually meet the claims. 
In other words, Common Criteria provides assurance that the process of 
specification, implementation and evaluation of a computer security product has 
been conducted in a rigorous and standard manner [8]. 
 
For the development of this guideline, Common Criteria will not be used 
because Open Source Applications are in constant development and change 
and can be used under many computer configurations, and Common Criteria 
only certifies that a product is secure under certain configuration specified by 
the vendor and for a specified severity of threats only. 
 
As Viega and McGraw say [10], “although the Common Criteria is certainly a 
good idea, security evaluation is unfortunately not as simple as applying a 
standard protection profile to a given target of evaluation. The problem with the 
Common Criteria is evident right in its name. That is, “common” is often not 
good enough when it comes to security.” 
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2.10 Risk Management 
 
Risk management is the process of measuring, or assessing, risk and 
developing strategies to manage it. Strategies include transferring the risk to 
another party, avoiding the risk, reducing the negative effect of the risk, and 
accepting some or all of the consequences of a particular risk. 
 
In ideal risk management, a prioritization process is followed whereby the risks 
with the greatest loss and the greatest probability of occurring are handled first, 
and risks with lower probability of occurrence and lower loss are handled later. 
In practice the process can be very difficult, and balancing between risks with a 
high probability of occurrence but lower loss vs. a risk with high loss but lower 
probability of occurrence can often be mishandled [8]. 
 
As said in [13], risk analysis can be divided in three processes: risk 
assessment, risk mitigation and evaluation and assessment. 
 
Risk assessment is the first process in the risk management methodology. 
Organizations use risk assessment to determine the extent of the potential 
threat and the risk associated with an IT system. 
The output of this process helps to identify appropriate controls for reducing or 
eliminating risk during the risk mitigation process. 
 
Risk mitigation, the second process of risk management, involves prioritizing, 
evaluating, and implementing the appropriate risk-reducing controls 
recommended from the risk assessment process. 
Because the elimination of all risk is usually impractical or close to impossible, 
using the least-cost approach and implement the most appropriate controls to 
decrease mission risk to an acceptable level, with minimal adverse impact on 
the organization’s resources and mission, is the usual method. 
 
The need for evaluation and assessment comes with the fact that in most 
organizations, the network itself will continually be expanded and updated, its 
components changed, and its software applications replaced or updated with 
newer versions. In addition, personnel changes will occur and security policies 
are likely to change over time. 
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These changes mean that new risks will surface and risks previously mitigated 
may again become a concern. Thus, the risk management process is ongoing 
and evolving. 
 
 
Figure 9: Risk Management [16] 
 
2.11 Healthcare Related Theory 
 
As the analysis part of this thesis is conducted against an Open Source 
Software Application for the healthcare field, which is used to manage electronic 
health records, some specific healthcare related theory is needed. In this 
section a fast overview on EHRs (Electronic Health Records) and on Indivo will 
be done. 
 
2.11.1 EHR 
 
An electronic health record (EHR) is a distributed personal health record in 
digital format. The EHR provides secure, real-time, patient-centric information to 
aid clinical decision-making by providing access to a patient's health information 
at the point of care.  
 
An EHR is typically accessed on a computer or over a network. It may be made 
up of health information from many locations and/or sources, including 
electronic medical records (EMRs).  
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An EHR almost always includes information relating to the current and historical 
health, medical conditions and medical tests of its subject. In addition, EHRs 
may contain data about medical referrals, medical treatments, medications and 
their application, demographic information and other non-clinical administrative 
information [8]. 
 
2.11.2 Indivo 
 
Indivo is a personally controlled health record system developed by the 
Children's Hospital Informatics Program (CHIP).  
 
The Indivo system is based on a 3-tier architecture: Indivo client, Indivo server 
and the Store. A communication protocol is developed for client-server 
communication. The client interface is a PHP web based interface. Java RMI 
handles the communication between the Indivo server and the Store. 
 
 
Figure 10: Indivo 3-tier architecture [14] 
 
Some of the most notorious characteristics of Indivo are [14]: 
 
• Personally controlled  
• Distributed  
• Web-based  
• Ubiquitously accessible to the nomadic user  
• Built to public standards  
• Open-source  
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3. Research Method 
 
In this chapter, I am going to describe the research methods employed to 
develop this mater thesis. 
First of all, I will describe the research methodology for the theory background 
part, and after this, the methodology for the development of the security 
guideline will be introduced.  
Finally I will describe the methods I will use to test the guideline against Indivo, 
an Open Source Consumer Application for the healthcare field. 
 
3.1 Background Theory Research Method 
 
For the Theory Background part of this thesis, first of all an initial schema of 
important theory concepts related with the content of this thesis was made. 
After this, looking through the initial schema, the most important and relevant 
topics for the good understanding of the thesis were selected, discarding those 
that were too general or not that relevant. 
 
After this first step, the remaining topics left in the schema were discussed with 
the thesis teacher and final adjustments on the schema were made, changing 
some topics and adding some relevant information that was not included yet. 
 
Gathering of information for the theory background was made through the 
reading and summarizing of several topic-related books like [6] or [10] and 
through the search on Internet in general information websites or specialized 
security websites like OWASP or insecure.org. 
 
Finally, like for every chapter of this thesis, the Background Theory part was 
sent to thesis teacher for feedback and readjustments. 
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3.2 Guideline Research Method 
 
During the development of the guideline, work will be done according to the 
waterfall method, as shown in figure 11. 
 
 
Figure 11: Waterfall model for the guideline 
 
The waterfall model particularly expresses the interaction between subsequent 
phases in a development process. It is important to be aware that before 
moving on to a subsequent phase, feedback should be received to assess that 
everything is correct.  
 
The reason why the waterfall model has been chosen for the development of 
the guideline, as opposed to various alternatives, is that there is time to do only 
one iteration, and in another model like spiral model, more than one iteration is 
needed. 
 
For the design and implementation of the guideline several books and other 
relevant sources (internet, mailing lists, etc…) related to the subject of this 
thesis - the security in software - will be used to get the most important keys 
about building and testing secure software. 
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3.3 Testing Methodology 
 
As said in earlier chapters, the testing of the guideline will be done against an 
Open Source Consumer Application for the healthcare area called Indivo. 
 
As this application is already in beta testing stage, not all the guideline will be 
applied, the part of the guideline referring to the security during design stage will 
be skipped mostly on the testing. 
 
For this stage of the thesis, it will be necessary to collect much information 
about vulnerabilities in specific pieces of software and about how to exploit 
those vulnerabilities.  
All this research and information will be conducted searching in specialized 
pages such as Security Focus, Secunia or Cert website. 
 
After the guideline will be tested against Indivo, results obtained will be 
presented and conclusions will be drawn. 
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4. Security Guidelines 
 
“There are two ways of constructing secure software: One way is to make it so 
simple that there are obviously no deficiencies, and the other way is to make it 
so complicated that there are no obvious deficiencies. The first method is far 
more difficult.”  adapted from C. A. R. Hoare 
 
In this chapter the main focus of this thesis, the Security Guideline, will be 
developed. 
 
This security guideline is intended to evaluate security on Open Source 
Consumer Applications. 
Overall, this guideline is a compilation of general and not so general “touch 
points”, methods and techniques that are well organized in sections and that 
provide a good methodology for testing and evaluating security in Open Source 
Consumer Applications. 
But this guideline can be used to evaluate security almost in every piece of 
software pretty much, open or not, despite the points that imply testing parts of 
the project that obviously are not available to every person willing to evaluate 
security on a closed source product. 
 
Now, and before going deep into the guideline, I will present the structure that 
will conform it. 
First of all general guidelines, that are common sense concepts, will be 
introduced. 
 
After this, I will describe organizational guidelines, that involve the planning of 
the security evaluation tasks such as who is the most appropriate person to 
evaluate security, how to keep up with new vulnerabilities and fixes and so on. 
 
Once organizational guidelines are done, it will be the turn for design guidelines 
to be taken into consideration. These will include orientation for design 
decisions like which programming language to choose, risk management and 
more. 
 
Then, implementation guidelines will follow, including among several subjects 
code review or using and reusing trusted components. 
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Last but not least, post implementation guidelines will close this chapter, 
including the testing of the product part, or the importance of a correct 
installation of the product and the necessary technologies to make it run. 
 
4.1 General Guidelines 
 
This part of the guideline is intended to give few really general touch points on 
security.  
That they are general doesn’t mean that they are not important, and one should 
always check them in order to have a stable “starting point” to go further in the 
security analysis of an application. 
 
As Viega and McGraw [10] say, there are some guiding principles that can help 
to improve the security outlook of an application. Following I will describe those 
principles in the order the authors use in the mentioned book. 
 
4.1.1 Secure the weakest link 
 
It is said that security is like a chain. Putting it simple, a software security 
system is only as secure as its weakest component, the same that a chain is 
only as strong as its weakest link. 
If someone is preparing to attack an application or system, he will try to attack 
the weakest part of it, because it will be easier to break into it. 
 
The weakest part of your system can be the software, or it can be its 
surrounding infrastructure such as other technologies needed to make that 
software run or some service you might be offering and that it is not secure. 
The way to act is to fix first the weakest components, and not the ones that are 
easier to fix, like lots of people do. 
 
Of course, this strategy can be applied forever, because after securing the 
weakest component, the next insecure item will become the weakest one. 100% 
security is never attainable, but securing the most obvious weak parts first is 
always a good practice to keep in mind. 
Securing the weakest parts of your system first always pays off. 
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4.1.2 Defense in Depth 
 
“Have a series of defenses so that if an error isn’t caught by one, it will probably 
be caught by another”. MacLennan 
 
The idea behind defense in depth is to provide more than one defensive 
strategy, so if one of them will fail or will result inappropriate, a subsequent 
defensive layer will mitigate the attack.  
 
It is important to make sure that various layers of security in a system works 
together in harmony to supplement each others functionality, but also to 
overlap, so that if one should fail, another layer will prevent a total compromise 
of the system, as said in OWASP [15]. 
 
4.1.3 Fail Securely 
 
Any complex system has failure modes. Failure is unavoidable and should be 
planned in detail. What is avoidable are security problems related to failure. 
Many systems, when failing, exhibit insecure behaviors, and that’s what should 
be tried to avoid. 
 
Any security mechanism should be designed in such a way that when it fails, it 
fails closed. That is, it should fail to a state that rejects all subsequent security 
requests rather than allow them. [15]. 
 
When a system fails, it may be a problem that it reveals critical system 
information as the error messages can contain information of weaknesses on 
the system that can be used by an attacker such as revealing the name and 
fields of a database.  
Detailed error messages should therefore never be sent to the client, but rather 
to a system administrator, or to a log. 
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4.1.4 Use the Least Privilege 
 
The principle of least privilege is based in that only the minimum access 
necessary to perform an operation should be granted, and only during the 
minimum amount of time necessary. 
When you give access to parts of a system, there is always the possibility that 
the privileges associated with that access will be abused. 
 
4.1.5 Compartmentalize 
 
The basic idea behind compartmentalization is to minimize the amount of 
damage that can be done to a system by breaking up the system into as few 
units as possible while still isolating code that has security privileges 
 
This principle has to be used in moderation; segregating each little bit of 
functionality will make your system or application almost impossible to manage. 
 
4.1.6 Keep it Simple 
 
Complexity increases the risk of problems. Avoiding complexity, you avoid 
problems at the same time. 
 
A complex design is never easy to understand, and is therefore more likely to 
include subtle problems. 
Complex code tends to be harder to maintain as well. To stay out of this kind of 
trouble, design and implementation should be as straightforward as possible in 
a software development process. 
 
Simplicity can be attained by making all security operations go through one or 
more choke-points where the traffic going through it will be checked, instead of 
implementing complex and elaborated security controls that subtracts usability 
to the final application. 
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4.2 Organizational Guidelines 
 
This part of the guideline looks at the key decisions that need to be made while 
planning the organization of the project. 
 
These decisions involve choosing the person or persons to carry out the 
security supervision and testing effort, setting out the testing plan and deciding 
when and under which circumstances to retest and what to include in the 
retesting effort. 
 
4.2.1 Who Should do Software Security 
 
As Gary McGraw says [16], as it stands in many organizations, software 
security is nobody's job.  
Developers, architects, and other builders are often unaware of security and 
possess little in the way of software security knowledge. When their software 
suffers from security failure, they don't often feel responsible, arguing that 
security is up to the people in operations who install and operate the software 
they create. 
 
When a security problem happens because of bad software, there really is 
nobody to hold responsible. The standard security people in operations are not 
really at fault (it's not their broken software), and neither are the software people 
(they're not security people). Organizationally, this is a textbook management 
problem. 
 
In an “utopic” environment, software security should be everyone’s job. In a 
more realistic one, setting up a team that will be in charge of the software 
security can make a big difference to solve the problem. 
 
Network security specialists are not the correct option, even if they know a lot 
about how software operations work, usually they don’t know enough about 
software itself to make a good software security practitioner. Put simple, they 
lack knowledge about compilers, language frameworks, software architecture, 
testing, and several other things necessary to be a solid software person. 
 
 42
Evaluating Security in Open Source Consumer Applications 
  
The correct option in this situation is to use experienced software developers to 
put them at the front of a security team. Security is easier to learn than software 
development, and a person already being a software developer will have more 
acceptance among the other developers, as they tend only to pay attention to 
fellow developers than rather an outsider who has little idea about software 
developing. 
Hiring external security consultants to form people in security issues is an 
option than despite being expensive, is worth to do because it always pays off. 
 
As open source applications usually can rely not only on its development team 
but also on an interested community of people that are going to make use of it, 
and the code is available to everyone, another suitable option could be that 
people from that community with enough security interest and background took 
care of the security evaluation in a free and collaborative way.  
If many people work on the security of an application individually, security 
issues that maybe someone will not find out, will be found by others, making 
this alternative also an interesting one. 
 
4.2.2 Setting out the Testing Plan 
 
A test plan can be as large as several hundred pages or as simple as a single 
piece of paper.  
 
Doing a really documented test plan can be good as it contains a 
comprehensive analysis of the system and it can be really helpful, but it can 
also be the most consuming time task in the project, slowing down the process 
and getting obsolete quite fast as keeping up-to-date with a really huge test plan 
requires a lot of efforts. 
 
As Steven Splaine says [17], the testing team should decide at what level of 
detail a test plan ceases to be an aid and starts to become a net drag on the 
project’s productivity. 
 
The security team should be able also to change the testing plan in light of 
newly discovered information such as previous test results that can reveal some 
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other problems, allowing this way the testing effort to focus on more important 
and in-need-of-attention areas. 
 
One should see the testing effort as an iterative task in which the last iterations 
are not defined at all, and they will get defined once the results of previous 
iterations will appear, making this way the effort more effective. 
 
4.2.3 Keeping up with the testing effort: Retesting 
 
Many security practitioners make really good test plans, but forget about a really 
important part of the testing effort, the retesting. 
Applications require continuous testing when they go live, because of the 
frequent changes that happens in applications and the technology surrounding 
them, and because of the often discovery of new vulnerabilities. 
 
As Steven Splaine says [17], even if the functional requirements of a system 
remain unchanged, a system that was deemed secure last week may become 
insecure next week. 
 
This can happen because of an unknown exploit becomes suddenly know to the 
attacker community, because additional devices are added to the system, but 
can be miss configured, because of installing a patch or a service pack that 
might change settings or open new security holes, because passwords maybe 
expiring and being reseted to shorter and easier ones, or even because such a 
trivial thing as people getting not sensitive to security alerts due to the high 
amount of false alarms. 
It is when this kind of events occurs that retesting should be carried out. 
 
Security testing should not be regarded as a one-time event, but rather as a 
recurring activity that will keep going on as long as the system remains active. 
 
4.2.4 What to Retest 
 
The security team should consider each test that has been used previously 
during the application’s initial testing effort as a possible candidate for 
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conforming the set of tests that should be carried on in a regular basis after the 
system goes live. 
 
“Regression tests are usually intended to be executed many times and are 
designed to conform that previously identified defects have been fixed and stay 
fixed, that functionality that should not have changed has indeed remained 
unaffected by any other changes to the system, or both”. - Steven Splaine 
 
The determination about if to repeat or not certain test depends really much on 
how the previous problems that the test revealed were fixed and in the 
likelihood of that problems reappearing. 
 
4.3 Design Guidelines 
 
After describing the organizational guidelines, we go on into a new section, the 
design guidelines. 
 
This part of the guideline focuses on the security efforts that should be done 
during the design stage of the application. 
 
This includes which programming language to use, which distributed object 
platform to choose if needed, which operating system to use, discusses about 
choosing to develop the application as an open source project or as a closed 
source one and the advantages or disadvantages that it involves and it includes 
also a crucial part of the software security, the risk management stage. 
 
The decision of including the risk assessment in this section has been taken 
due to the convenience that risk assessment should be done in the earliest 
stage of the product development that is possible, and the design stage is the 
most appropriate one. 
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4.3.1 Choosing a Programming Language 
 
As Viega and McGraw say [10], the single most important technology choice 
most software projects face is which programming language or set of languages 
to use for implementation.  
 
The choosing of a specific language can be determined by several factors or 
requirements like needing efficiency or representation power. 
This ends up usually in choosing C or C++ because of efficiency requirements, 
not considering that other languages can be more secure for implementing the 
application and still to meet the efficiency requirements. 
 
 
Other big reason for choosing certain languages is based on the comfort or 
familiarity that the software developer has with that language.  
But making those choices usually indicates really a poor view and not much 
worries about security, and not much people takes a while to think about the 
benefits that using other languages can bring to the project. 
 
One of the biggest mistakes companies make when choosing the programming 
language for a product is not to consider the impact that the language will have 
over the software security. 
 
This section doesn’t intends to give the definitive answer about which language 
to use, first of all because that could be considered advertising a specific 
language, secondly because security of a programming language depends a lot 
on how the language is used (i.e. some software developer can use a language 
with built-in security but due to the lack of knowledge not to use the feature, and 
other software developer can perhaps use a “less secure” language but due to 
great knowledge on it and being really careful, to develop a more secure 
application) and also because the aim of this section is to give a general advice 
about what to look at when choosing the programming language to develop an 
application. 
 
Of course, if having good knowledge about several programming languages 
and knowing how to take profit of their security features, the wiser choice would 
be to pick one with built-in security, exception handling and that sort of features 
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that when used properly would make your application more secure, like Java or 
C#, in detriment of C, C++ or others that doesn’t provide that features. 
For a more detailed language comparison, you can take a look in [18]. 
 
In conclusion, when it comes to choose a language to develop an application it 
is important to think carefully which one offers better security features, but as 
important as this is also to know how to use properly the language selected and 
not to be less careful when the language implements aids like exception 
handling because of thinking that “the language will take care about it for me”. 
 
4.3.2 Choosing a Distributed Object Platform 
 
As Viega and McGraw say [10], these days, client-server applications are being 
constructed with software systems based on distributed objects, such as 
CORBA, DCOM or EJB using RMI. 
These technologies provide with remote availability of resources, redundancy 
and parallelism with much less effort than old-fashioned programming. 
 
When thinking about software security, each of these technologies has different 
security features that should be considered when choosing which Distributed 
Object Platform to use. 
The aim of this section is not to point out which one specifically to choose, as 
each application has different needs, but to make clear in which way each of 
these technologies provide security. 
 
4.3.2.1 CORBA 
 
CORBA implementations can come with security service or not, it greatly varies 
from one implementation to another, having the worst case, you will not have 
any security implemented, you may have security only half the way in some 
implementations, or to find an implementation with full security features 
implemented. Of course the recommendation is to get a fully secure 
implementation. 
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CORBA defines two levels of security, level 1 is intended for applications that 
need to be secure but where the code itself doesn’t need to be aware of 
security issues, and level 2 that supports more advanced security features.  
CORBA allows as the most significant feature secure communications using 
cryptography. CORBA also provides authentication services, which can be 
made transparent to the application. 
 
Access to particular operations, such as the ones of an administrative interface 
for example, can be restricted in CORBA, and it has a wide set of possibilities 
when managing privileges in a distributed system, allowing great flexibility on 
what an object can do with those privileges. 
 
4.3.2.2 DCOM 
 
DCOM is the equivalent of CORBA but only working in Microsoft platforms. 
Security features in DCOM are quite similar to CORBA ones even if they look 
totally different. 
 
Authentication, data integrity, and secrecy are all wrapped up into a single 
property called the authentication level. Authentication levels only apply to 
server objects, and each object can have its own level set. 
 
Authentication level range goes from 1 to 7, being 1 the lowest (no 
authentication or security at all), and 7 the highest security level (called packet 
privacy-level authentication, which fully encrypts all data and authenticates each 
packet). The range left in the middle of levels 1 and 7 increases step by step 
security until reaching level 7.  
It is not the purpose of this guideline to describe each level on detail but only to 
give a general vision, the advice is to consult Microsoft support page [19] for a 
better and deeper view of those levels. 
 
4.3.2.3 EJB and RMI 
 
As Viega and McGraw say in [10], Enterprise Java Beans (EJB) are Java's 
version of a distributed object platform. EJB client/server systems make use of 
Java's Remote Method Invocation (RMI) implementations for communication. 
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While the EJB specification only provides for access control, most 
implementations usually provide encryption facilities that are configurable from 
the server environment. 
 
EJB’s access control system consists in moving access control decisions into 
the domain of the person assembling the application. That way someone not 
associated with development can specify the policy. 
 
A critical security issue to note is that EJB implementations are built on top of 
RMI, and may inherit any problems associated with RMI implementations.  
In the past, RMI had a poor reputation for security because RMI was configured 
to allow clients to download required code automatically from the server when it 
wasn’t present. This feature was generally an all-or-nothing toggle and the 
negotiation was possible before a secure connection had been established. 
It is for this reason that Viega and McGraw don’t recommend in their book [10], 
the use of EJB and RMI at all. 
 
But security in RMI has evolved as you can check in java.net Krishnan 
Viswanath’s article [20], and these issues have been corrected, making it a 
totally valid choice as well as the rest of previously described technologies. 
 
4.3.3 Choosing an Operating System 
 
In this section, I will provide some advice about what to think on when choosing 
an operating system. 
Yet again, it will not point out a specific operating system, because as before it 
happened with the programming language section, it is not only about the 
selected operating system but also a lot about how the selected system is 
configured and administrated. 
 
As CERT® Coordination Center says [21], if you have knowledgeable staff, you 
may choose to use freely available OS versions so that you can maintain or fine 
tune the product to meet specific requirements. You might have more 
confidence in the modified OS because you were responsible for making 
changes or closely involved in the implementation of patches or workarounds. If 
you know about a vulnerability and understand the problem, you may want to 
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apply fixes immediately to the source code rather than wait for an upgrade or 
patch to be released through other channels.  
If you select freely available OS versions and don't have the resources to 
maintain software in-house, it's important to know that you could be placing your 
system at a high risk of compromise.  
 
If you do not have the time or expertise to modify and maintain an operating 
system in-house, you might choose a commercial vendor product. When you 
buy a commercial operating system, you can purchase a service contract to 
provide you with patches, upgrades, and other customer assistance. 
Alternatively, you could buy third-party service or select products from vendors 
who implement fixes and make patches publicly available.  
When choosing an operating system, there are many things you need to 
consider like availability of source code vs. binaries, availability of technical 
expertise (internal and external), maintenance and/or customer support, 
customer requirements and usability and cost of software, hardware, and 
technical support staff. 
 
No matter the choice you make, you should first carefully review and 
understand the needs of your organization or customer base in terms of 
resources, cost, and security risk. The best advice is to compare the available 
products and services to your needs, and then determine what product best 
matches your needs. 
 
4.3.4 Closed Source vs. Open Source 
 
“Given enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow”. – Eric Raymond 
 
The point about choosing to develop an application as open or closed source 
has been discussed a lot. 
The truth is, however, that once again not any of the two approaches is 
definitely more secure and that secure applications can only be developed with 
good security practices and with being careful when developing it. 
 
In one side, one might think that developing as open source makes applications 
more safe, as their code is reviewed by many people making this way easier to 
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discover possible vulnerabilities and to fix them in less time, making more 
difficult for the “bad guys” to exploit them, and also because if you understand 
the code, you can even fix the vulnerability by yourself without having to wait for 
a patch release.  
But this fact is true also the other way around, as open source application’s 
code is available to everyone, it is also easier for the malicious user to discover 
vulnerabilities and thus, exploiting them in an easier way. 
 
In the other side, closed source applications rely in what is called “security by 
obscurity”, which is a double edged weapon. 
It is true that for a malicious user, is far more difficult to find a vulnerability 
without being able to take a look into the code, and it also makes difficult to 
develop an exploit for it, as a good understanding of what the code is doing is 
necessary to do that. 
But it is also true that it is possible to use reverse engineering to discover how 
the code is working, and there is also the problem that once the vulnerability is 
found, users of the application are totally unprotected against attacks exploiting 
that vulnerability until the vendor of the application releases the fix for it. 
Also, relying in security by obscurity might lead to mistakes like implementing 
self-made security solutions thinking that as no one knows how they work, no 
one will be able to break them. But that doesn’t mean that they are more secure 
that an already implemented one and well known, if it has proven to be secure 
already. 
Put simple, it would not be clever to develop a cryptographic algorithm by 
yourself for an application, because even if no one knows how it works, it is 
likely that it will be not as safe as some of the already implemented algorithms 
like DES, as good cryptographic algorithms remain good even if people know 
how they work. 
 
As Jason Miller says [22], although you can take an open source project, 
compare it against a closed source project, and say that one is more secure 
than the other based on some number of observations or measurements, this 
determination will probably be based on factors other than the nature of the 
project's open or closed source code.  
Secure design, source code auditing, quality developers, design process, and 
other factors, all play into the security of a project, and none of these are 
directly related to a project being open or closed source. 
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Neither closed source nor open source is inherently more or less secure than 
the other, making a blanket statement such as that would be foolish. The best 
conclusion that one can make on this subject is that the two methodologies are 
not "better or worse", but instead, different from one another. I don't believe that 
you can answer that question any better. 
 
4.3.5 Risk Management 
 
As said in “A Risk Management Guide for Information Technology Systems” 
[13], Risk Management is the process that allows IT managers to balance the 
operational and economic costs of protective measures and achieve gains in 
mission capability by protecting the IT systems and data that support their 
organizations’ missions. 
 
Risk management involves three stages: risk assessment, risk mitigation, and 
evaluation and assessment. 
 
4.3.5.1 Risk Assessment 
 
Risk assessment is the first process in the risk management methodology. 
Organizations use risk assessment to determine the extent of the potential 
threat and the risk associated with a project. 
The output of this process helps to identify appropriate controls for reducing or 
eliminating risk during the risk mitigation process. 
 
Risk assessment can be divided into several steps, although some of them can 
be carried out concurrently. 
 
First step is used for system characterization. Characterizing a system 
establishes the scope of the risk assessment effort, delineates the operational 
authorization (or accreditation) boundaries, and provides information (e.g., 
hardware, software, system connectivity, and responsible division or support 
personnel) essential to define the risk. 
The gathering of this information can be done through questionnaires, 
interviews to personnel and/or project’s documentation review. 
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After this step, the next one is to determine the possible threats, vulnerabilities 
and its sources by developing a list of system vulnerabilities (flaws or 
weaknesses) that could be exploited by the potential threat-sources. 
Recommended methods for identifying system vulnerabilities are the use of 
vulnerability sources, the performance of system security testing, and the 
development of a security requirements checklist. 
 
Next to this step comes to set the likelihood of that threat sources to exploit the 
vulnerabilities. 
To get a global rating that indicates the probability that a potential vulnerability 
may be exploited by the correspondent threat source the following factors must 
be considered: 
 
• Threat source motivation and capability 
• Nature of the vulnerability 
• Existence and effectiveness of current controls. 
 
After considering these factors, a severity level rated from low to high will be 
assigned to the vulnerability. 
 
The next major step in measuring level of risk is to determine the adverse 
impact resulting from a successful threat source exploiting a vulnerability. 
This impact can be described in terms of loss or degradation of any, or a 
combination of any, of the following three security goals: integrity, availability, 
and confidentiality. 
 
Last step of the risk assessment is to develop control recommendations that 
could mitigate or eliminate the identified risks, as appropriate to the 
organization’s operations, are provided. The goal of the recommended controls 
is to reduce the level of risk to the system and its data to an acceptable level. 
The control recommendations are the results of the risk assessment process 
and provide input to the risk mitigation process, during which the recommended 
procedural and technical security controls are evaluated, prioritized, and 
implemented. 
As not all the possible controls can be implemented to reduce loss, a 
cost/benefit analysis should be conducted for the proposed controls, to 
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determine which of the controls can be justified by the reduction in the level of 
risk. 
 
4.3.5.2 Risk Mitigation 
 
Risk mitigation involves prioritizing, evaluating, and implementing the 
appropriate risk-reducing controls recommended from the risk assessment 
process. 
 
Risk mitigation is also divided into several steps, but the implementation of the 
previously mentioned security controls is the task of the application’s 
development team, and to carry out the cost/benefit study is a task for the 
management section of the project, so I will not go into more deep in this 
section. 
 
4.3.5.3 Evaluation and Assessment 
 
In most projects, the application itself will continually be expanded and updated, 
and its surrounding technologies will maybe change from time to time. In 
addition, personnel changes will take place eventually and security policies are 
likely to change over time. 
These changes mean that new risks will appear and risks previously mitigated 
can become a real risk again. That’s why the risk management process is 
always in a loop that goes on during all the lifecycle of the application. 
 
Risk management should be conducted and integrated in the lifecycle of the 
application because it is a good practice and supports the project’s business 
objectives or mission. 
There should be a specific schedule for risk management, but the process 
should also be flexible enough to allow changes such as major changes to 
policies and/or new technologies. 
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4.4 Implementation Guidelines 
 
Once finished with the design guidelines, we move into the implementation 
stage guidelines 
 
This part of the guideline focuses on the security efforts that should be done 
during the implementation stage of the application. 
 
In this section I will talk about code review, using COTS (Commercial Off-The-
Shelf) and the convenience of using and reusing trusted components. 
 
4.4.1 Code Review 
 
“Debugging is at least twice as hard as programming. If your code is as clever 
as you can possibly make it, then by definition you're not smart enough to 
debug it.” - Brian Kernighan 
 
Programmers make little mistakes all the time like a missing semicolon or 
placing an extra parenthesis. Most of the time, such mistakes have no more 
repercussion than the compiler noting the error and after the programmer fixing 
the code. After this, the implementation process continues and subsequent 
similar errors are fixed in the same way. This quick cycle of feedback and 
response doesn’t appear to happen with most security vulnerabilities, which can 
remain hidden for a long time before someone actually discovering them. And 
the longer a vulnerability remains hidden, the more expensive is to fix it 
properly. 
 
To solve this problem is when code review comes into action.  
There are two ways of reviewing code, manually and with the aid of automated 
reviewing tools. 
 
Manual code review is an extremely time-consuming activity, and to do it 
effectively one must first know how security vulnerabilities look before being 
able to start to manually review the code, not to mention that applications often 
have more than one hundred thousand lines of code, making the task virtually 
impossible to perform or requiring more than one person to perform the review. 
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As McGraw says in [16], static analysis tools compare favourably to manual 
audits because they're faster, which means they can evaluate programs much 
more frequently, and they encapsulate security knowledge in a way that doesn't 
require the tool operator to have the same level of security expertise as a 
human auditor.  
Just as a programmer can rely on a compiler to enforce the finer points of 
language syntax consistently, the operator of a good static analysis tool can 
successfully apply that tool without being aware of the finer points of security 
bugs. 
 
Automated code scanning tools go through the code, searching for common 
patterns that might cause a vulnerability to appear, comparing the code with 
some set of fixed rules that they have (i.e. like searching for the function strcpy() 
in c coded applications as it is well known that the use of this function can lead 
to buffer overflows easily), and after performing the analysis they present a list 
of results that include all that pieces of code that matched their rules. 
 
Using an automated scanning tool, although, doesn’t means to run it and to 
have the work already done. 
The output generated by an automated scanning tool stills need the manual 
verification of a human, although the work is quite smaller as the places to look 
at are already listed, saving you the time that takes to go through all the code. 
Usually the output of these tools needs to be checked as they usually produce 
what is called false negatives, that mean that the tool is not perfect enough to 
discover every single vulnerability, and false positives, that mean that some 
times what is reported as a vulnerability, depending on the context of the 
application is not such vulnerability. 
There's no way for any tool to know automatically which problems are more or 
less important to you, so there's no way to avoid looking through the output and 
deciding which issues should be fixed and which ones carry an acceptable level 
of risk.  
Apart from this, no automated scanning tool can tell you design issues such as 
if password’s security enforcement is good enough or not, just to put an 
example. 
 
In conclusion, both self-expertise and a good code scanning tool are needed. 
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4.4.2 Using COTS 
 
Commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) defines the software products or technologies 
that are already made and available for sale, lease, or license to the general 
public. They are often used as alternatives to in-house developments. 
 
The motivation for using COTS components is that they will reduce overall 
application development costs and involve less development time because the 
components can be bought or used for free (if they are open source), instead of 
being developed from scratch.  
 
But using COTS can be a double edged weapon, because apart from the good 
features that using COTS bring like reducing costs and development time, they 
can also introduce in your application or system security vulnerabilities, as no 
one assures you that a particular COTS that you are using is vulnerability free. 
When using COTS, the best measure is to check as much as possible if the 
component looks to be secure and if it has been in use for some time without 
presenting security issues, basically, to check if it can be trusted or not. 
 
And this is what the next section is about, using and reusing trusted 
components. 
 
4.4.3 Using and Reusing Trusted Components 
 
When it comes to use components that have not been developed in-house, it is 
clever to make sure before using them that they have been tested by people 
you trust or with a solid security reputation, and that there haven’t been 
published documents with relevant vulnerabilities about them. 
 
As said in OWASP [4], the more successful a component has proven itself to be 
over time, the better reason to reuse it. Many people developing computer 
systems have gone through the same kind of problems, and may have invested 
large amounts of time researching and developing robust solutions to them. In 
many cases, components have been improved through an iterative process. 
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Using and reusing trusted components makes sense both from a resource 
stance and from a security viewpoint. When someone else has proven they got 
it right it is beneficial to take advantage of it. 
 
Let’s put as example the case of cryptographic libraries or algorithms. Well-
used libraries and algorithms are much more likely to be more robust than 
something implemented in-house, because people are more likely to have 
noticed implementation problems. 
 
4.5 Post Implementation Guidelines 
 
To finish this guideline, I will proceed to present the post implementation 
guidelines. 
 
These guidelines are to be applied after the implementation of the application, 
and they will test the security through penetration testing, which is a good 
method to check the security of the application in its real environment. 
Also the importance of a correct configuration of the system will be discussed. 
 
4.5.1 Penetration Testing 
 
As said in OWASP [4], having tested the requirements, analyzed the design and 
performed code review, it might be assumed that all issues have been caught.  
 
Hopefully, this is the case, but penetration testing the application after it has 
been deployed provides a last check to ensure that nothing has been missed.  
 
Penetration testing can be divided in several steps which will be explained next. 
 
4.5.1.1 Information Gathering 
 
The first phase in penetration testing is focused on collecting as much 
information as possible about the application. Information gathering is a 
necessary step of a penetration test.  
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Using tools like search engines, scanners, sending simple HTTP requests, or 
specially crafted requests, it is possible to make the application to discover 
information by sending back error messages or revealing the versions and 
technologies used by the application. 
 
4.5.1.2 Authentication Testing 
 
Second step in penetration testing should be authentication testing. Testing the 
authentication schema means understanding how the authentication process 
works and using that information to circumvent the authentication mechanism. 
 
First thing that can be tested here is if there are default user accounts that 
usually some technologies just create for the first login and that should be 
changed the first thing always, but sometimes can remain there just by mistake 
and pairs of users/password that can be guessable by dictionary testing. 
After this, next step is to try to gain authentication by brute force methods. This 
step usually takes too much time and can make the application to block the rest 
of the attempts after some invalid tries. 
Next to this, directory traversal testing should be used to try to find a way to 
bypass the application and gain access to system resources. Typically, these 
vulnerabilities are caused by misconfiguration. 
Another possible test to perform is to check how the application manages the 
forgotten password functionality or if the “remember me” function is present, as 
this might mean that password is being stored somewhere or that a cookie is 
being stored to remember your session. 
 
4.5.1.3 Session Management Testing 
 
Session management covers all controls on a user from authentication to 
leaving the application.  
Checking how an application handles session management and understanding 
it is important as it can reveal vulnerabilities that can provide a way to hijack a 
session or to make a replay session attack. 
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One of the ways to achieve this is by session token manipulation, which 
consists in modify a session token (i.e. hidden field, cookie or sessionID) so the 
session management system will think that we are a user we are not, thus being 
able to access in an illegitimate way the information that only that user should 
be able. 
Another is to check if session token is transmitted from the client to the server in 
an encrypted transport by default. If that transmission is not done over a secure 
protocol like SSL or it is not encrypted before being sent, it can be exposed to 
eavesdropping. 
 
4.5.1.4 Data Validation Testing 
 
As said in OWASP Testing Guide [23], the most common application security 
weakness is the failure to properly validate input from the client or environment. 
This weakness leads to almost all of the major vulnerabilities in applications, 
such as interpreter injection, locale/Unicode attacks, file system attacks and 
buffer overflows. 
The data must be validated by the application before it’s trusted and processed. 
The goal of this step is to test if the application actually does what is meant to 
do and does not do what its not.  
 
To perform this step, many tests can be done, including every existing injection 
vulnerability test, overflows or cross site scripting. 
Several of these attacks have been explained in the theory part of the thesis 
and it remains out of the scope of this guideline to explain every single attack 
that can be carried out. 
 
4.5.1.5 Denial of Service Testing 
 
What a Denial of Service (DoS) attack is has been already explained in the 
theory part of the thesis 
. 
There are types of vulnerabilities within applications that can allow a malicious 
user to make certain functionality or sometimes the entire application server 
unavailable. These problems are caused by bugs in the application, often 
resulting from malicious or unexpected user input. 
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The first DoS case to consider involves a common defense to prevent brute-
force attacks on user passwords. The most usual measure against this is to lock 
an account from use after between three to five failed attempts to login. This 
means that even if a legitimate user tries to provide his valid password, he will 
be unable to login to the system until his account has been unlocked. This 
defense mechanism can be turned into a DoS attack against an application if 
there is a way to predict valid login accounts. 
Another way to achieve a DoS is to find some buffer overflow that will crash the 
application, thus making the service unavailable. 
Also, if the application allows the user to determine how many of an object to 
create on the application server and it doesn’t sets any upper limit, a malicious 
user can make the server to run out of memory. 
A DoS case can appear also if the user can provide the input for a loop control 
variable, as he can make an infinite or high resource consuming loop to run. 
 
Summing up, every user action that can make the application to crash or to 
consume high amounts of resources can result on a DoS case.  
 
4.5.1.6 Web Services Testing 
 
"By 2005 Web services shall have reopened over 70% of the attack paths 
against internet-connected systems, which were closed by network firewalls in 
the 1990's" – Gartner 
 
The vulnerabilities in web services are similar to other vulnerabilities such as 
SQL injection, information disclosure and leakage but they also have unique 
XML/parser related vulnerabilities. 
The first of these vulnerabilities involves XML not functioning properly when it’s 
malformed. The XML message must be well formed in order to be successfully 
parsed. Malformed messages may cause unhandled exceptions to occur. 
Other possible attack might be for an attacker to craft an XML document that 
contains malicious elements in order to compromise the target system. In this 
way, the attacker can include in the message the code needed to exploit an 
SQL injection in the web service, for instance. 
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4.5.2 Configuration Management 
 
Checking security on the application is important, but it would not be worth 
anything if the system where application is running is missconfigured. 
Configuration management consists in checking that everything is configured as 
it should be, so system security will be as higher as possible. 
 
Among the actions that should be performed are turning off all features by 
default, as they are well known by attackers and can be used to gain illegitimate 
access to the system, always change default passwords in system’s running 
applications as much of them come with default passwords that are well known, 
to encrypt network communications to prevent data leakage, to check in a 
regular basis the latest security vulnerabilities published and to apply the latest 
security patches. 
 
Every system is unique and has different applications running, making 
impossible to provide a “general secure configuration”. 
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5. Practical Application and Results of the 
Guideline 
 
In this chapter, the previously developed guideline will be applied to an Open 
Source consumer application called Indivo. 
The aim of this section is to demonstrate how to apply the guideline to an open 
source consumer application. The results obtained from the testing of the 
guideline with Indivo will be used to discuss the application’s possible security 
issues and to test the guideline itself to check if it is working as expected. 
 
The guideline is intended to be applied from the very first stage of development 
of an application.  
As Indivo is an application that is already in its beta-testing stage and already 
under development and continuous change, some parts of the guideline can’t 
be applied as intended, because some decisions have already been taken.  
The guidelines previous to the implementation guidelines just will be discussed 
in terms of correctness on the decisions already made by the developing team 
of Indivo. 
 
Indivo is an Open Source Consumer Application for the medical field developed 
by the Children’s Hospital of Boston. Its main purpose is to manage data from 
electronic health records. Because of the nature of this data and the high 
degree of privacy and confidentiality that it requires, security is a crucial factor 
on this application. 
 
5.1 General Guidelines in Indivo 
 
The security guideline on this thesis starts with some general advice called 
General Guidelines. 
The security guideline on this thesis is not only intended to actively test the 
security of an application but also to give advice about good practices while 
developing applications. 
These general guidelines are nothing that you can directly apply, but some 
basic principles that developers have to keep in their minds during all the 
application development. 
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That’s why they can’t be directly applied to Indivo as the rest of the guidelines, 
and they will be skipped during the practical part.  
 
5.2 Organizational Guidelines in Indivo 
 
In this part, the organizational guidelines previously developed will be applied 
on Indivo.  
5.2.1 Selecting the security professional 
 
As starting point, I will address the issue of who should take care of the security 
on Indivo. Obviously, in this particular case, I will be the one testing the security 
of Indivo, as that is the purpose of the practical part of this thesis. 
As I said in this part of the guideline, the most suitable person for taking care of 
the security of an application should be a quite experienced software developer 
with security formation, as in software security, good understanding of software 
development process is important. 
As open source applications usually can rely not only on its development team 
but also on an interested community of people that are going to make use of it, 
and the code is available to everyone, another suitable option could be that 
people from that community with enough security interest and background took 
care of the security evaluation in a free and collaborative way.  
If many people work on the security of an application individually, security 
issues that maybe someone will not find out, will be found by others, making 
this alternative also an interesting one. 
 
In this particular case, my background as student of master on computer 
science makes me to match both cases, as I am not only experienced in 
software developing and interested in security, but also I form part of that 
“community” developed around Indivo as one of the aims of this thesis is to test 
security on it. 
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5.2.2 Setting the Test Plan 
 
In this subsection of the guideline the basic testing plan has to be presented 
and developed. 
This section is not intended to make penetration testing directly but to explain 
the basis and the steps that will be followed in the whole testing effort. 
In the case of being able to perform various iterations on the testing effort, the 
test plan can be changed according to newly discovered security issues that 
remained hidden in the first test plan development. 
In this particular case, only one iteration is going to be performed, so the test 
plan will be set up only once and will remain unchanged. 
 
5.2.2.1 Introduction 
 
The goal of this test plan is to check whether the Open Source Consumer 
Application called Indivo presents or not security issues that might be 
dangerous for the confidentiality and privacy of the data it manages, and 
therefore, solved.  
In order to achieve this goal, risk analysis, code review and penetration testing 
will be performed.  
 
5.2.2.2 Features to be tested 
 
• Client-side application security 
• Client-side to server-side application communication security 
• Server-side application security 
• Support technologies security 
• System and configuration security 
 
5.2.2.3 Test Approach 
 
The first step will be to make a risk analysis in order to determine which 
features carry higher risk for the application and which lower, so the testing can 
focus more on those that can represent a higher risk. 
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After getting the risk analysis results, the second step will be performing code 
review. In order to do this, I will use a code review application for Java code 
called FindBugs, which will reveal which parts of the code can represent 
potential dangers for the security of the application. 
 
Last step will be to perform penetration testing. Penetration testing will be 
divided on two parts, one focused exclusively over Indivo, and the second 
focused on finding vulnerabilities in the surrounding technologies that Indivo 
needs to run.  
The penetration testing involves: 
 
On Indivo 
 
Use a proxy (WebScarab - OWASP) to check for possible vulnerabilities as 
unsafe session IDs, trying to modify requests to server before they leave the 
client, modifying parameters sent to server, changing hidden fields, etc. 
 
Perform checks to search for possible SQL or XML injections (both in the 
BerkeleyDB database and the MySQL database), perform checks for Cross Site 
Scripting and check for directory transversal vulnerabilities that could make an 
attacker to access files that he is not intended. 
 
Use a sniffer or a packet capture tool to intercept communication between client 
and server to check if relevant data can be disclosed. 
 
Use brute forcing and dictionary based attacks on the logging system to check if 
it’s possible to repeatedly login with the same username and to break into the 
application. 
 
On the surrounding technologies 
 
Check vulnerability tracking lists such as CERT, Secunia, Securityfocus, etc, to 
find possible issues and vulnerabilities with the surrounding technologies that 
Indivo uses. 
As Indivo needs certain versions of those technologies and most of them are 
not last versions, it might be possible to exploit old vulnerabilities on those 
products. 
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Check for vulnerabilities on following products: 
 
• Apache Tomcat 5.5  
• Apache 2.0 
• Java 1.5 
• PHP 5.1.2 
• Java Bridge 3.0.7 
• MySQL Server 5.0 
 
5.2.3 When and what to Retest 
 
If testing is an important part of the security practice, retesting has at least the 
same importance. 
Something that has been tested and proved to be safe can become unsafe 
suddenly because a lot of factors including a change in the configuration or 
operating system, a new patch for the application, a new vulnerability that 
suddenly appears and before no one knew of, etc. 
 
As Indivo is on beta testing at the moment, and a lot of things are still being 
implemented or recoded and a lot of functionality being added, retesting of 
Indivo should happen each time that a new version is released or major relevant 
changes are made. Put simple, at this stage of development, retesting should 
be performed each time that the application’s development cycle starts a new 
iteration. This way, the accumulation of possible vulnerabilities is avoided, 
which is unlike to happen if retesting only happens when final product would be 
released. 
In this stage, in my opinion everything included in the original test plan should 
be retested without exception and the newly found issues should be added to 
the original test plan, as the application is under constant implementation 
changes and that changes can affect not only a single part of the application but 
the whole application. 
 
After Indivo will be already in the production stage (it will be fully operative and 
not in beta stage), retesting should happen with a fixed periodicity and should 
be more focused on finding out and testing the new vulnerabilities that have 
appeared on vulnerabilities tracking lists since last tests and in some important 
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security issues such as password’s strength, and proper configuration of the 
system and the application. Also retesting should be carried out every time a 
new update or patch is released. 
 
5.3 Design Guidelines in Indivo 
 
The design guidelines are to be applied in the design stage of the application. 
As Indivo is already out of this stage because it is already in beta testing and 
implementation, the guidelines will not be applied as supposed but will be used 
to compare them with the decisions already taken in Indivo and to determine the 
correctness of those decisions. 
 
5.3.1 Choosing the Programming Language 
 
Choosing a programming language to develop an application is one of the most 
important decisions during the design stage.  
Indivo server has been developed in Java, and that has several advantages 
from a security point of view. 
 
Java provides the possibility of restricting application’s resource access by the 
use of security policies. 
Java provides mechanisms to enforce strong memory protection. These 
mechanisms remove the possibility of either maliciously or inadvertently reading 
or corrupting memory locations outside boundaries of the program. As a result, 
applications cannot gain unauthorized memory access to read or change 
contents.  
Java provides full support for encryption and digital signatures, making use of 
powerful encryption technology.  
Java provides good rule enforcement as it is completely object-based. By using 
objects and classes to represent corporate information entities, it is possible to 
explicitly state the rules governing the use of such objects. 
Java does a fairly reasonable job making programmers to catch the errors and 
exceptions that might be thrown, mitigating this way unhandled exceptions that 
might make the application to crash.  
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Apart from all the security features, Java code is fully portable to different 
operating systems, making the choice of using Java for Indivo even more 
recommendable. 
As for Indivo client interface, it has been developed in PHP. Maybe the most 
natural option would have been developing the interface in jsp, as the rest of 
Indivo is coded under Java. 
 PHP is a language that has not that many security features as jsp, but in the 
other hand is a really popular web development language and it is in continuous 
upgrade.  
5.3.2 Choosing a Distributed Object Platform 
 
Indivo uses Java RMI to encapsulate the communication between the server 
and the IO Store. 
The option here is simple; there are only two distributed object platforms 
suitable in this case, Java RMI and CORBA. 
As Indivo is already implemented using Java, the most natural choice in my 
point of view is to use Java RMI as distributed object platform. 
In terms of security, both platforms provide good security measures that despite 
being implemented using different mechanisms, accomplish their goal in a 
proper way.  
But it is more likely that using Java RMI, as the development team is already 
used to work under Java, and RMI is simpler to work with, since the developer 
does not need to be familiar with the Interface Definition Language of CORBA, 
fewer mistakes will be made during the implementation, thus reducing this way 
the possibility of implementation flaws. 
 
 
5.3.3 Choosing an operating System 
 
Indivo is designed to run under whatever operating system that can handle Java 
and Apache Tomcat and Apache Server, which, as far as I know every 
Operating System can. 
I will not evaluate this point as to choose operating system is quite an open 
choice and the evaluation would be the same as the advice I gave on the 
guideline part. The wiser decision is to choose an operating system that fits the 
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needs of your company and that you have enough resources and experience to 
maintain and to keep fully under control. 
 
 
5.3.4 Risk Analysis 
 
The purpose of this risk analysis is to get a clear view of the potential 
threats/vulnerabilities Indivo can be exposed to, to rate them in a severity scale 
with a range from low to high impact and to propose a possible solution to 
minimize them or to make them disappear. 
 
5.3.4.1 System Characterization 
 
First step is to get the system characterization to establish in a better way the 
scope of the risk analysis. 
 
Hardware 
 
Acer Laptop with processor IntelCoreDuo@1,66MHz, 1 Gb of RAM. Direct 
connection to Internet through a Broadcom 10/100 net card and wireless card 
also operative. 
 
Software 
 
Windows XP Professional edition Service Pack 2, with Norton Protection 
(Antivirus + Firewall) 
Indivo version 3.0 beta running under Apache Tomcat 5.5 and Apache Server 
2.0, with Java 1.5, PHP 5.1.2, Java Bridge 3.0.7 and MySQL Server 5.0. 
 
5.3.4.2 Vulnerability list 
 
Second step is to get a list of possible vulnerabilities. 
 
• Session ID’s might be guessable. 
• Indivo should work over https but also works over http. 
 70
Evaluating Security in Open Source Consumer Applications 
  
• Possibility of accessing server side files like .xml’s files can disclose 
important information. 
• Error messages can disclose internal database structure or server way 
of operating (product versions, other technologies server is using).  
• Indivo uses surrounding technologies (PHP, Apache, Java, etc) that only 
can be exact versions (i.e. only PHP 5.1.2 can be used, not other).  
• Possible attacks like SQL injection or XSS might be possible. 
• Unsafe, unused or test code might be found among Indivo source code. 
• Password complexity is not enforced, asking only for up to 5 or more 
character passwords. 
 
5.3.4.3 Vulnerability severity rating, adverse impacts and control 
recommendations. 
 
In this last step, I will present the severity rating of the vulnerabilities, its 
possible adverse impact and control recommendations to mitigate or eliminate 
the possible vulnerability. 
 
Rating should be done also by risk probability, because risk is severity * 
probability.  
Unfortunately to know the probability of a certain risk, more than one iteration is 
required, because it is not easy to measure the probability before effectively 
trying to exploit the vulnerability.  
As the scope of this thesis involves only one iteration, only a severity rating will 
be done. 
 
Threat Effect Possible Solution Severity 
Session ID’s might 
be guessable 
Possible risk of 
session hijacking 
Session ID’s should 
be unique, never 
reused, randomly 
generated and 
nearly impossible to 
guess from an 
obtained sequence 
of previous ID’s 
High 
Indivo should work 
over https but also 
works over http 
Transmission of 
data in plain text 
with the possibility 
of obtaining 
username/password 
Use https protocol 
always to provide 
encrypted 
communication 
High 
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pairs by a sniffer or 
by a in-the-middle 
proxy 
Possibility of 
accessing server 
side files like .xml’s 
files can disclose 
important 
information 
Attacker can get 
important 
information about 
how the Indivo 
server operates 
Keep server side 
important and not-
relevant-for-
anyone-else files 
inaccessible to other 
than the server 
machine 
Medium 
Error messages can 
disclose internal 
database structure   
or server way of 
operating (product 
versions, other 
technologies server 
is using)  
Attacker can get 
extra entry points 
with the newly got 
information 
Error messages 
should be totally 
neutral and not to 
reveal any 
important 
information 
Medium 
Indivo uses 
surrounding 
technologies (PHP, 
Apache, Java, etc) 
that only can be 
exact versions (i.e. 
only PHP 5.1.2 can 
be used, not other).  
Being unable to 
update to more 
recent versions of 
this products might 
end up in well 
known 
vulnerabilities 
being used to attack 
the server. 
Implement Indivo 
in a way that is 
compatible with 
new versions of the 
same technologies 
High 
Possible attacks like 
SQL injection or 
XSS might be 
possible 
Attacker can maybe 
fake other user’s 
identity or make 
other users to 
execute some 
unwanted actions 
Check if Indivo is 
vulnerable to this 
attacks 
High 
Unsafe, unused or 
test code might be 
found among Indivo 
source code 
Attacker can check 
the source code as it 
is an open source 
project which code 
is available to 
everyone, and 
exploit some 
vulnerability in the 
code. 
Perform a source 
code review in 
order to check for 
possible unsafe or 
repeated code. 
Medium 
Password 
complexity is not 
enforced, asking 
only for up to 5 or 
more character 
passwords 
Passwords might be 
easy to brute force, 
leading to unwanted 
access. 
Ask not only for a 
minimum length 
(higher than 8 
characters) but also 
for combinations of 
letters, numbers and 
special characters. 
Medium 
Table 1: Vulnerability severity ranking, impact and control for Indivo. 
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5.4 Implementation Guidelines in Indivo 
 
In this part of the security guideline I will evaluate the correctness of the source 
code on Indivo server with the help of a source code review tool for Java code 
called FindBugs, and the COTS used on Indivo. 
 
5.4.1 Code Review 
 
To review the source code of Indivo server I have used an automated source 
code reviewing tool for Java called FindBugs. The usage of the tool is really 
easy and intuitive. The first step was defining a name for the project and to add 
both the jars that were part of Indivo and the source code files (.java) 
corresponding to that jars. In the next image you can see how I did this. 
 
 
Figure 12: Configuration for FindBugs 
 
After doing this, FindBugs proceeds to analyze all the classes inside the jars in 
order to find the relevant bugs and to match those bugs with the corresponding 
lines that match the bugs in the source code files. 
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Once this is done, a result screen with the bugs sorted by kind of bug is 
presented. When clicking on a specific bug, FindBugs shows the information 
about the bug, some advice on how to correct it and the source code lines 
where the bug was found highlighted. The results of Indivo source code review 
can be seen in the next image as they are presented by FindBugs. 
 
  
Figure 13: FindBugs result report. 
 
After getting the results, I checked manually all the reported bugs, taking out the 
bugs that the program suggested that could be false positives or that were not 
security relevant but only performance relevant. 
 
Following, I will comment briefly the most important bugs found after the code 
review.  
 
Bad Practice 
 
Under the category of dropped or ignored exception FindBugs gives to results 
of methods that ignore exceptions, thus making possible that an uncaught 
exception might appear making the application to crash. 
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Correctness 
 
Under the category of infinite loops, FindBugs reports an infinite recursive loop 
that might cause a stack overflow with the risk of the program crashing. 
Under the category of null pointer dereference FindBugs reports five results that 
might make the program to cause a NullPointerException making it to crash. 
Two of these results might be false positives. 
 
Malicious Code Vulnerability 
 
Under this section FindBugs reports eight possible fields that are not final but 
should be. A mutable static field that is not final could be changed by malicious 
code or by accident from another package. The field should be made final to 
avoid this vulnerability. 
 
5.4.2 Commercial Off-the-Shelf 
 
In this section, the security of the COTS that Indivo uses will be discussed, so a 
better understanding can be achieved. 
 
The first COTS that I will analyze is the database system that Indivo store uses. 
This is an open source technology called BerkeleyDB and it has been 
developed by SleepyCat. 
Berkeley DB is notable for having a simple architecture. Programs access the 
database using in-process API calls. It does not support SQL or any other query 
language, nor does it support table schema or table columns. A program 
accessing the database is free to decide how the data is to be stored in a 
record; BerkeleyDB puts no constraints on the record's data. 
Choosing BerkeleyDB as main data storage has several advantages and it is a 
technology that has proven to be really safe. BerkeleyDB has not been reported 
any known vulnerability or security issue, and as it is accessed by API calls and 
doesn’t supports any query language, it is immune to injections.  
 
Indivo uses Xajax 0.2.4 implementation for integrating AJAX on the PHP 
interface. Xajax is an open source PHP class library that allows you to easily 
create powerful, web-based, AJAX applications using HTML, CSS, JavaScript, 
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and PHP. Applications developed with Xajax can asynchronously call server-
side PHP functions and update content without reloading the page.  
Xajax 0.2.4 version was recently reported with one Cross-site Scripting 
vulnerability with bugtraq ID 24006. 
Xajax is prone to an unspecified cross-site scripting vulnerability because the 
application fails to properly sanitize user-supplied input.  
An attacker may leverage this issue to execute arbitrary script code in the 
browser of an unsuspecting user in the context of the affected site. This may 
help the attacker steal cookie-based authentication credentials and launch other 
attacks. The proposed solution is to upgrade to Xajax 0.2.5. 
 
Indivo uses Log4j implementation for logging events at runtime. With log4j it is 
possible to enable logging at runtime without modifying the application binary. 
The log4j package is designed so that these statements can remain in shipped 
code without incurring a heavy performance cost. Logging behavior can be 
controlled by editing a configuration file, without touching the application binary. 
No vulnerabilities for Log4j have been reported. 
 
Indivo uses Sun XACML implementation for management of access policies. 
XACML is an XML-based language for access control that has been 
standardized in OASIS. XACML describes both an access control policy 
language and a request/response language. The policy language is used to 
express access control policies (who can do what when). The request/response 
language expresses queries about whether a particular access should be 
allowed (requests) and describes answers to those queries (responses). 
No vulnerabilities for Sun XACML have been reported. 
 
Indivo uses various Apache commons-framework packages, like commons-
logging, commons-beanutils, commons-collections, etc. 
No vulnerabilities for these packages have been reported. 
 
Indivo uses the Avalon framework included now in Apache Excalibur project. 
The Avalon Framework consists of interfaces that define relationships between 
commonly used application components, best-of-practice pattern enforcements, 
and several lightweight convenience implementations of the generic 
components. No vulnerabilities for the Avalon framework have been reported. 
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5.5 Post Implementation Guidelines in Indivo 
 
In this section penetration testing will be performed against Indivo as stated in 
the Test Plan design in the organizational guidelines. 
 
5.5.1 Penetration Testing 
 
Penetration testing will be divided into two sections: 
 
• On Indivo 
 
• On the surrounding technologies of Indivo 
 
5.5.1.1 Testing Indivo 
 
First step on penetration testing is to gather as much information as possible 
about the application. Of course, in this concrete case all the information is 
already known, but I will perform some tests to gather information about the 
server and applications working on it anyways. It is always a good way to see 
which information actually an attacker can get. 
 
First of all, I will proceed to fingerprint the server. To fingerprint the server 
means to get information about the kind of server and the version. This can be 
achieved by sending an http request directly and looking at the response 
headers, or by the use of automated tools. 
 
I will use a tool called HttPrint to gather information. The result can be seen in 
the following image. 
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Figure 14: Server Fingerprint. 
 
As can be seen in the image, the program gave as result that the server is an 
Apache server version 2.0.59 and moreover, that it is running PHP 5.1.2 and 
that it is running on a Windows system (Win 32). 
This kind of information can provide an attacker of an entry point to our 
application by trying to exploit known vulnerabilities of the server version 
discovered. 
By using a common port scanner, we can check for more applications running 
in the target machine. Using a regular port scanner, we obtain the following 
results. 
 
 
Figure 15: Port Scan results. 
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As it can be seen in the previous image, the scanner detects MySQL service 
running on port 3306 (default MySQL port), and an alternative http server on 
port 8080, that it is easy to assume it is Apache Tomcat, as it usually runs on 
that port. 
 
Once this has been done, I will proceed to evaluate Indivo first using a proxy 
called WebScarab, developed by OWASP. A proxy is basically a program that 
acts as intermediate between the client and the server, allowing you to monitor 
all the traffic going from the client to the server and the other way round, letting 
you to modify that data either before being sent to the server or before reaching 
the client. It also has much other functionality like testing strength on session 
IDs or revealing all hidden fields of the client side application so you can freely 
modify them in order to obtain some undesired result. 
In the following image, you can see an overview picture of WebScarab. 
 
  
Figure 16: Web Scarab. 
 
The first thing I will try is to analyze the strength of Session IDs because if 
session IDs are guessable in some way, security of Indivo could be 
compromised seriously. 
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To perform this task, I will use one of the functions of WebScarab, which 
permits to store several different session IDs and after that analyzing them and 
getting a statistic summary on their regularity and predictability. To feed 
WebScarab with enough IDs, I log in and out repeatedly forcing the session ID 
to regenerate and storing each ID in WebScarab. 
After this process WebScarab perform an analysis and show the following 
results, captured in the following images. 
 
  
Figure 17: Numerical analysis for session IDs. 
 
 
Figure 18: Distribution analysis for session IDs. 
 
As it can be seen, Indivo session IDs are totally random and they don’t follow 
any identifiable distribution pattern. This makes Indivo session IDs difficult to 
guess. 
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After analyzing session IDs, I will try to search for hidden fields in Indivo that 
can be changed in order to obtain some advantage. I will do this using 
WebScarab tool to automatically reveal hidden fields. 
After trying different hidden fields found in “Edit Personal information” template, 
“Add annotation” template and others, no relevant hidden field that could be 
exploited was found. 
 
After searching for hidden fields, next step to take will be to try to modify 
requests sent to Indivo server. Using WebScarab I will try to change those 
requests and the methods they ask for, to see if a regular user can access 
methods that he is not intended to use. 
In order to find methods that a regular user is not able to use, I log in as 
administrator of the system and I try to create a new user, to see the method 
that is invoked. This method results to be “showEnrollmentForm”. 
 After this I try to modify a simple request to the server from a user of the group 
patients, and to add the previous method. 
 
 
Figure 19: Changing an Indivo request. 
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The result of doing this is a regular user being able to access a private administrative 
interface, as shown in the following image. 
 
 
 
Figure 20: Accessing an administrative interface. 
 
After doing this, I try to create a new user, but the access policy doesn’t allow 
me to do this. Anyway, being able to access an administrative interface as a 
regular user is not safe in terms of application security, and administrative 
interfaces should be protected. 
 
After this step, I will try using WebScarab to send malformed requests to the 
server in purpose to cause errors and to see if errors can disclose important 
information. The result of this action ends up in what can be seen in the next 
image. 
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Figure 21: Indivo Error message. 
 
As can be seen in the error message, Indivo reveals way too much information 
about the directory structure. Errors should be as brief as possible and never to 
show relevant information about the structure of the server. Revealing directory 
structures of the server can end up in a directory transversal exploitation to 
retrieve a file that a normal user is not intended to get access to. 
 
Next two steps will be checking data input validation vulnerabilities such as SQL 
injections and Cross-site Scripting. 
 
As previously said on the COTS section, Indivo uses BerkeleyDB as storage 
medium. BerkeleyDB doesn’t use any querying language nor tables or rows or 
columns, and is not possible to inject it in anyway. It uses an API to perform the 
actions and stores data in a text encrypted file. 
The other place that can be checked for injection is the log database that stores 
successful logins with their username and session ID, but as the query is not 
constructed until the username and password have been verified against the 
BerkeleyDB, it is not possible to inject, as whatever trial to inject in user or 
password fields will result on an unsuccessful login and the query against the 
MySQL database will not be constructed at all. 
 
To check for Cross-site scripting vulnerabilities, I have tried to insert scripting 
language (like <script>alert(document.cookie)</script>) in fields that after being 
edited are displayed again to the same user or to others (like insurance notes).  
Trying this has brought not any successful result as Indivo seems to filter 
scripting language in a way it is not displayed again to any user at all. For 
 83
Evaluating Security in Open Source Consumer Applications 
  
example, in the case of the insurance notes instead of displaying an alert, it 
displays an empty note. 
 
After this, I will try to browse through the server directory structure to see if 
relevant documents that are not intended to be accessed can be actually 
retrieved in some way. 
By the error messages given by Indivo, one can more or less get a quite 
accurate directory structure. After browsing through it for a while, a lot of 
documents of the Indivo UI can be accessed, including the document were 
Indivo stores the access profiles and policies: “ping-security-profiles.xml”, like 
can be seen on the following image. 
 
 
Figure 22: Accessing unintended files. 
 
After this step, next thing to do is to check the integrity of the communications 
between the client and the server. Usually, for this a tool called packet sniffer is 
used, but as the testing environment has the client and the server on the same 
machine, I will be using a proxy that will intercept communications between 
client and server, as usually sniffers cannot intercept communications going 
through the loopback interface inside the computer. 
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The first thing to try is to login and to intercept the packet sent to the server with 
the login information. The result of this action can be seen in the next image. 
 
 
 
Figure 23: Capturing login information. 
 
As can be seen, Indivo works by default over http, making the transference of 
the login data to the server over plain text, thus being possible to capture that 
information to impersonate a legitimate user. 
 
The next thing I am going to try is to intercept a session ID and to try to use it to 
hijack the session of a legitimate user. 
First step is to use the sniffer, or in this case the proxy to intercept a login 
packet. Obviously, it would be easier just using the login information on the 
packet, but the aim of this is to check whether Indivo permits to use a session 
ID more than once at the same time or not, and if it is enough to provide a valid 
session ID to access the session of a user or login information is also needed. 
After intercepting the packet, I get a valid session ID (PHPSESSID= 
896e578bffa76c6ed1e5490c2caea342) that is just being used by a user that 
logged in right now. 
After this, I open a new browser and I directly enter the address of the Indivo 
viewer (http://localhost/indivo-ui/viewer.php). I intercept the request with the 
proxy, and I change it so the session ID that I stole will be sent with the request, 
as you can see in the following image. 
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Figure 24: Editing request to forge a stolen SessionID. 
 
As the result of all this process, I end up logged as administrator (it was the 
user’s session ID I did the experiment on and that I stole), and I am able even to 
create a new user. 
This proves that stolen Session IDs can be used as long as the legitimate user 
is still logged in and the session doesn’t time-out. 
 
Last set of tests will try to discover whether is possible or not to use automated 
password cracking tools to conduct a dictionary attack or a brute force attack 
against the login system. 
As far as I have tried, not any remote password cracker works with Indivo, as 
Indivo login form doesn’t use a regular method like post or get, but uses an own 
developed method called processForm(), thus making impossible to send 
automatically passwords through regular methods like post/get. 
Anyways, I tried by hand to make incorrect logins by hand to check if it is 
possible to repeatedly login with the same user without blocking the access 
after several tries. The result is that you can login in an incorrect way as many 
times as you would like with the same user.  
In consequence, if someone would write a remote tool that would be able to 
automate the login process, it would be totally possible to attempt to perform a 
dictionary attack or a brute force cracking on the Indivo login system.  
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5.5.1.2 Testing Indivo’s Surrounding Technologies 
 
In this section, I will address the vulnerabilities that exist for each of the 
technologies Indivo uses to run. For this, pages like Security Focus or Bugtraq 
will be used. 
The main problem here relies in that Indivo needs specific versions of those 
technologies, making impossible to upgrade to newer and safer versions. 
 
Apache Tomcat 5.5 
 
Apache Tomcat presents two vulnerabilities, one that permits cross-site 
scripting and another that permits directory transversal attacks. 
 
As explained on Security Focus webpage [24],  
 
Apache Tomcat's documentation web application includes a sample 
application that is prone to multiple cross-site scripting vulnerabilities 
because it fails to properly sanitize user-supplied input.  
An attacker may leverage these issues to execute arbitrary script code in 
the browser of an unsuspecting user in the context of the affected site. 
This may allow the attacker to steal cookie-based authentication 
credentials and to launch other attacks. The only solution is to upgrade to 
last version of the product (v. 6.0.11). 
The other vulnerability consists on Apache HTTP servers running with the 
Tomcat servlet container are prone to a directory-traversal vulnerability 
because it fails to sufficiently sanitize user-supplied input data. Exploiting 
this issue allows attackers to access arbitrary files in the Tomcat webroot. 
This can expose sensitive information that could help the attacker launch 
further attacks. 
 
Apache Server 2.0.59 
 
Only one vulnerability can be found in Apache Server 2.0.59, Apache 
"mod_alias" URL Validation Canonicalization Vulnerability. 
In words of Secunia [25],  
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this vulnerability can be exploited by malicious people to bypass certain 
security restrictions and disclose potentially sensitive information. The 
vulnerability is caused due to a canonicalization error in the "mod_alias" 
module in the handling of case-sensitive alias directive arguments on file 
systems supporting case-insensitive directory names. This can e.g. be 
exploited to disclose the source code of applications placed in the "cgi-
bin" directory on certain non-default configurations where the ScriptAlias 
directive references a directory inside the document root by accessing an 
URL with a capital directory name (e.g. "CGI-BIN"). The solution consists 
in editing the configuration to ensure that alias directives (e.g. ScriptAlias) 
references directories outside of the document root. 
 
Java 1.5.0_08 
 
Java version 1.5.0_08 doesn’t present any known vulnerability according to 
Bugtraq, Secunia or SecurityFocus. 
 
PHP 5.1.2 
 
PHP 5.1.2 presents multiple vulnerabilities (44), and it is not worth to comment 
one by one, as they are too many, and information can be easily found on 
SecurityFocus webpage [24]. 
 
Java Bridge 3.0.7 
 
Neither SecurityFocus nor Secunia can find any security issue on Java Bridge 
3.0.7 
 
MySQL 5.0.37 
 
The following security vulnerabilities for MySQL 5.0 can be found in Secunia 
webpage [25]: 
 
MySQL Two Privilege Escalation Security Issues, that consists on two 
security issues that have been reported in MySQL, which can be exploited 
by malicious users to gain escalated privileges. It is possible for a user to 
rename a table without having DROP privileges and it is possible that 
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stored routines defined with SQL SECURITY INVOKER do not change 
back privileges when returning and can be invoked by users to gain 
escalated privileges. 
 
MySQL IF Query Denial of Service Vulnerability, that consists on an error 
when handling specially crafted IF queries, which can be exploited to 
crash the server (Denial of Service attack). 
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6. Discussion 
 
Security is an important topic, not only to Open Source Consumer Applications, 
but to all kinds of computer system or software. The reason why consumer 
applications need to focus on security is because they tend to contain sensitive 
information that should not be compromised.  
This is even truer when talking about web applications like Indivo, because 
being accessible in a remote way, puts them in a special position. The fact that 
they are open to attacks potentially launched by anyone connected to the 
Internet implies that a heavy load of threat countermeasures needs to be 
employed in order to protect confidential data. 
 
It is important to understand that security is not something that may be added to 
an application after a complete development process. This is not only a risky 
idea, but also a great increase on the development effort, as modifying an 
already implemented application requires much more work than to integrate 
security through all the application’s lifecycle, from the earlier stages of 
development until the last one. 
Some people argue that integrating security all the way through the 
development process is costly as well, and it does require some extra time and 
effort, but the truth is that it saves you from unwanted results at the end of the 
development cycle.  
Applications do need security, and the best way to make sure that they are 
developed in a way that confidential data is as safe as it can be, is making sure 
you pay attention to the potential security issues that might arise from the very 
beginning. 
 
The main chapter of this thesis is the development of a Security Guideline. The 
developed Security Guideline is not only useful to avoid well-known threats and 
vulnerabilities, but it also encourages integration of security practice from the 
beginning of the application’s lifecycle, that will result in a more secure 
application, so it may in fact help prevent future threats as well.  
The Security Guideline includes general guidelines that should be present 
during all stages of the application’s development, and also specific guidelines 
for every specific stage of the application’s lifecycle. 
About the guideline applicability, personally I didn’t find any place after the first 
iteration that should need improvement, but I do believe that if applied to a full 
 90
Evaluating Security in Open Source Consumer Applications 
  
project, or applied by a more experienced expert, then more areas of 
improvement should be found. 
 
After developing the guideline, the next step taken has been to try the guideline 
over a real application. There is no better way to check if something is working 
than to try it on a real environment. 
 
To try the guideline, an Open Source Consumer Application for the healthcare 
field called Indivo was chosen. The high confidentiality that the data this 
application manages requires made it a good target to test the guideline. 
Of course, it would have been much better to apply the guideline from the 
beginning on an application that was in its earliest stage of development, but to 
perform this, great amount of time would have been required, as I would have 
had to go through all the development of an application, and it was not possible 
to spend that much time. 
That’s why some of the sections of the Security Guideline were not applied as 
intended, but just used to check if decisions already taken in the development of 
Indivo made sense and were good choices. 
The sections that could be applied as intended were the design of the test plan, 
the risk analysis, the code review and the penetration testing part both in Indivo 
and in the surrounding technologies. 
 
The test plan was developed trying not to leave anything important that should 
be checked out of the scope, but also trying not to make it too big as the 
amount of time to develop the thesis was limited. 
After having applied the Test Plan to Indivo, and because of the results 
obtained, I think that it was complete enough to achieve a reasonable security 
evaluation, but that maybe with more time I could have gone in more deep for 
example in the code review, as making a good code review implies having a full 
understanding of the application’s code, so one can check the real severity of 
the issues discovered by the automated code reviewing tool, and to discard in a 
more confident way the false positives. 
 
About the risk analysis, after seeing the results of the penetration testing, I think 
I assessed quite in an accurate way which could be the risks that Indivo might 
be exposed to. 
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The scope of the thesis only involved one iteration on the testing of the 
guideline, and that’s why I classified the risks by severity and not by risk, that 
requires to know also the probability of a given vulnerability, as risk is 
severity*probability. Usually to know the probability of a vulnerability being 
exploited more than one iteration is needed, as the first iteration is used to 
evaluate if the vulnerability is easy to detect and to exploit. 
A good example of how the first iteration can evaluate the probability of a 
certain vulnerability being exploited is for example the case of session ID’s 
being guessable. After the first iteration, it has been proved that session ID’s on 
Indivo are random and don’t follow any particular distribution, thus being difficult 
to guess. This fact would set the probability for that particular vulnerability 
happening really low. In the other hand, after first iteration probability for the 
vulnerability of the login information being intercepted and exploited should be 
set really high as it is something easy to perform. 
 
The code review was carried out using an automated code reviewing tool called 
FindBugs. From the results obtained, I only commented the bugs that affected 
security of the application directly, as the ones that were only a matter of code 
correctness and efficiency fall out of the scope of this thesis. 
As said before, this section should need improvement as the time limited me on 
getting a deep understanding of the source code of Indivo, thus making not 
possible to determine totally whether the found bugs were truly a security 
menace or not. 
 
Last but not least, I will comment the results obtained in the penetration test 
section. This section was the most satisfactory in my point of view, as it not only 
revealed several security issues, but let me to practice a real penetration test, 
which gave me a better understanding on how several vulnerabilities work and 
made me to improve my knowledge and creativity a lot. 
 
The first step of the testing involved getting the characterization of the system to 
evaluate. This was not a real necessary task as all the characteristics of the 
system were already known, but it is a good way to check which information an 
outsider attacker can get of the system. 
 
The second step was to use a proxy between the client and the server to check 
several issues like strength of session IDs, changing hidden fields to reveal if it 
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is possible to take advantage of it to perform some unwanted action, changing 
methods on the requests sent to Indivo and sending malformed requests to 
make Indivo display error messages in purpose to check if relevant information 
was disclosed. 
After analyzing several session IDs, it has been proved that they are random 
enough and they are not distributed in a fixed pattern that could make them 
guessable; Indivo’s session IDs present a high degree of strength. 
Changing hidden fields didn’t allow performing any unwanted action, as they 
didn’t modify relevant information, and when they did, Indivo access policy 
denied the action. 
Changing the methods inside the requests sent to Indivo resulted in the 
possibility of accessing administrative interfaces that should be not accessible 
to regular users. This cannot be considered a high risk degree as any action 
made with that interfaces was denied by Indivo’s access policy. This fact 
doesn’t mean that it is not in fact a vulnerability that should be fixed, as 
administrative interfaces should have restricted access to regular users. 
By sending malformed requests to Indivo, I made Indivo to display error 
messages that contained way too much information about the server’s directory 
structure. This should be fixed as it can be used to carry directory transversal 
attacks with the result of accessing unintended files. 
 
Next step was to perform various checks to find out if Indivo was vulnerable to 
injection, to cross-site scripting attacks, and if by browsing through server 
directories files that shouldn’t be accessed could be accessed. 
Because of the nature of the data storage that Indivo uses (BerkeleyDB), it was 
not possible to perform any injection attack on Indivo. Trying to embed scripting 
languages in parts of Indivo that could be displayed back to other users or to 
the same, didn’t worked for the cross-site scripting checks, as Indivo seems to 
filter this by not displaying scripts. 
Because of the errors displayed by Indivo, it is not difficult to get in mind a quite 
accurate directory structure of the server. By exploiting this, I was able to 
access the access policy file on the server. This should be fixed, as accessing 
this kind of files is totally unacceptable and should be restricted. 
 
After this checks, the next step is to check the integrity of the communications 
between the client and the server. In a normal testing scenario, this would be 
done with a packet sniffer or a packet capture tool, but in this case, as both 
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client and server are in the same machine and communications use the 
loopback interface, regular sniffers cannot capture this kind of traffic and using a 
proxy between client and server was decided for evaluation purpose. 
By intercepting the packets that were going from the client to the server, login 
information could be fully retrieved. This is a direct consequence of Indivo 
working over http by default, and not by https. This is a really important security 
issue and should be fixed. 
By intercepting random packets, I got a session ID from a session that was 
currently active. I used this ID to try to perform a session hijack attack. By 
addressing my browser directly to the Indivo viewer, intercepting the packet 
requesting this action and modifying it inserting the session ID previously stolen, 
I managed to get inside the session of another user and to perform whatever 
action I wanted. This is a severe security issue that should be fixed, maybe not 
allowing two sessions in the application with the same session ID. I also 
checked if this attack worked once the legitimate user logged off, but it didn’t, 
which means that Indivo does a good work eliminating used session IDs. 
 
Last step of the penetration testing on Indivo involved using brute force and 
dictionary attacks to go through Indivo’s login system. This couldn’t be 
performed with the existing automated tools as Indivo uses not regular methods 
like GET or POST to send the login information form, but an own developed 
method called processForm().  
What I was able to try by hand is to introduce repeatedly incorrect login 
information for the same user, to check if after several incorrect logins Indivo 
blocks the user account. The result was that Indivo allows to introduce unlimited 
times incorrect login information. This could end up in someone developing a 
self-made automated tool to try to crack Indivo’s login system. It could be solved 
by implementing a two stage login or a delay on login. 
 
Test of the surrounding technologies that Indivo needs to run was made simply 
querying databases of known vulnerabilities as SecurityFocus, Secunia or 
Bugtraq. This investigation revealed that several of the technologies that Indivo 
needs to run were affected by well known bugs. 
Indivo requires specific versions of several products, making their update totally 
impossible, and this represents a security issue, as long as some of those 
vulnerabilities are only solved in newer versions of the same product, and this 
makes the system running Indivo exposed to several security issues that cannot 
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be avoided. The only solution is that Indivo should be made more flexible in the 
versions of the technologies it needs to run. 
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7. Conclusion and Further Work 
 
The aim of this Master Thesis was to provide a better understand on how to 
develop secure Open Source Consumer Applications through the development 
of a Security Guideline and the test of this Guideline on a real Open Source 
Consumer Application. 
 
One of the most important things that should be always present while 
developing an application from the first stage is to integrate security in every 
stage of development, from the first to the last. The philosophy of patch-after-
development has been proved to be more expensive and inefficient. 
 
In my point of view, both the development of the Security Guideline and the 
posterior testing of the guideline have been successful, as a working 
methodology has been established and several security issues have been 
revealed in Indivo. 
 
When working on this thesis, I have experienced the difficulty of finding 
information on how to effectively assess security in applications, in addition to 
descriptions of vulnerabilities, threats, and countermeasures. I therefore hope 
that my thesis will provide information that will be useful for those who are to 
develop a consumer application, both open source, like the one evaluated in 
this thesis, and closed source, as the fundamental principles for security are the 
same. As the Security Guideline is platform independent, it can be applied to 
every application. 
 
7.1 Further Work 
 
Further work that could be done after this thesis is to test the guideline on a 
starting project that is in its first stage of development, so the guideline can be 
totally tested and applied to more than one iteration. This way I believe better 
results could be achieved, and also the guideline could be updated and 
redesigned in the steps that will be find out that don’t work as intended. 
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